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SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST
Dustin E. Buehler *
Abstract: Federal court subject-matter jurisdiction rules incur a significant social cost—
when jurisdiction is found lacking, courts must dismiss, no matter how many years and
resources the parties have spent on the case. Indeed, hundreds of belated jurisdictional
dismissals occur each year after parties have already engaged in discovery, dispositive
motions, or even trial.
Federal judges tolerate this waste largely because they view nonwaivable jurisdictional
rules as a function of structural values rooted in the Constitution, rather than efficiency
concerns. In contrast, scholars tend to focus primarily on efficiency arguments while
discussing jurisdictional nonwaivability, de-emphasizing important structural interests. Both
theories are overly monistic and fail to consider the full range of jurisdictional values.
This Article advances two claims. First, jurisdictional values are pluralistic and
multipolar, implicating structural and efficiency interests that are fundamentally
incommensurable. We should not simply attempt to maximize a single set of jurisdictional
values. And because there is no single unit of measurement for weighing structural values
such as “separation of powers” against efficiency interests such as “litigation waste,” we
should resist forcing these interests through a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, courts and rule
makers should seek equilibrium among all relevant values when fashioning jurisdictional
rules.
Second, using this equilibration approach, the Article proposes a solution to jurisdiction’s
social cost: Courts should resolve all subject-matter jurisdiction questions at the outset of
litigation. Federal district courts should affirmatively certify the existence of jurisdiction in
every case; after that point, objections to statutory federal jurisdiction would be waived.
Moreover, to accommodate both structural and efficiency interests, appellate courts should
have discretion to immediately review jurisdictional orders when the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs. Lastly, federal courts should use the threat of sanctions to deter privateparty abuse of jurisdictional rules.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Supreme Court has reminded us that federal court
subject-matter jurisdiction is both inflexible and unforgiving. 1 It has
stressed that the parties cannot consent to or waive jurisdictional
requirements, 2 and that federal courts have an obligation to raise
1. True to form, the procedurally active Roberts Court issued sixteen opinions on jurisdictional
issues during the October 2012 Term—about twenty percent of the Court’s docket.
2. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1350–51 (2013) (holding
that a nonbinding stipulation regarding the amount in controversy does not negate federal
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jurisdictional defects, on their own initiative if necessary. 3 The Court
also has emphasized that litigants can raise jurisdictional defects at any
time, even for the first time on appeal. 4 And once again, we have
witnessed the harsh effect of latent jurisdictional defects: The court must
dismiss the suit, forcing the parties to start over, no matter how many
years and resources they have spent on litigation up to that point. 5
The social waste generated by jurisdictional nonwaivability 6 is real
and alarming. Federal courts conduct a belated jurisdictional inquiry in
approximately five hundred cases each year, 7 analyzing subject-matter
jurisdiction for the first time months or years after the close of the
pleadings, 8 and sometimes only after the case is on appeal. 9 Courts
dismiss about forty percent of these cases, wasting resources the parties
have already spent on discovery, dispositive motions, and sometimes
even on trial. 10 Given the exorbitant cost of modern litigation—it is not
jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act).
3. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013) (describing jurisdiction
as “an essential limit on our power”); Gonzalez v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012)
(noting that courts must consider jurisdiction sua sponte).
4. Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013).
5. E.g., Lozman v. City of Rivera Beach, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 735, 739–40, 746 (2013)
(holding jurisdiction did not exist, despite years of litigation and a trial on the merits); see also
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824 (noting that “[t]ardy jurisdictional objections . . . can therefore result in a
waste of adjudicatory resources”).
6. This Article uses the phrase “jurisdictional nonwaivability” to refer to the characteristics that
make federal court subject-matter jurisdiction exceptional: the inability of parties to consent to or
waive it, the obligation of courts to raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte, and the ability of litigants
or courts to invoke jurisdictional defects at any stage of litigation.
7. A comprehensive review of all federal district court opinions on Westlaw issued during June
2013 and containing the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” yielded forty-six opinions with belated
jurisdictional analysis. Assuming June 2013 is a representative sample month, this suggests that
federal district courts belatedly analyze jurisdiction in more than 500 cases each year.
8. E.g., Chambers v. Kan. City Kan. Cmty. Coll., No. 11-CV-2646-CM-DJW, 2013 WL
3322315, at *2–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (dismissing claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
nearly two years after suit was filed), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL 326021 (D. Kan. Jan. 29,
2014); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL 3283859, at
*1–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (analyzing jurisdiction six years after plaintiffs filed their class action,
while deciding summary judgment motions).
9. E.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt., 497 F. App’x 313, 315–18 (4th Cir. 2012)
(deciding jurisdictional issue raised for the first time on appeal).
10. District courts dismissed eighteen of the forty-six belated jurisdictional analysis cases
decided in June 2013, suggesting a dismissal rate of about 200 cases per year. See, e.g., Chambers,
2013 WL 3322315, at *2–3 (dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction nearly two years after suit
was filed, while adjudicating a motion for summary judgment); Grill v. Quinn, No. 2:10-cv-0757
GEB GGH PS, 2013 WL 3146803, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 2013) (dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction despite “long and complex” proceedings because “recent events” disclosed plaintiff did
not have standing for his claims).
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unusual for litigants to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on
discovery and merits litigation 11—the social cost of belated
jurisdictional dismissals is intolerable.
Federal courts tolerate this waste, however, largely because they view
jurisdictional nonwaivability as a function of immutable structural
values rooted in the Constitution. When judges dismiss cases on
jurisdictional grounds, they reference federalism and separation-ofpowers interests, 12 casting themselves as impartial enforcers of
jurisdictional boundaries drawn by Congress. 13 In doing so, they deemphasize non-structural considerations, such as efficiency and
economic waste. Indeed, some courts have stated that these nonstructural considerations are entirely irrelevant to jurisdictional
analysis. 14
Several scholars have criticized this overreliance on structural
interests, basing their arguments primarily on efficiency values.15 They
point to the significant social waste resulting from belated jurisdictional
dismissals, 16 as well as the tendency for litigants to strategically contest
jurisdiction in ways that exacerbate this waste (i.e., when a party raises a
jurisdictional defect for the first time after losing on the merits, in order
to void the adverse judgment). 17 While bringing much-needed attention
11. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The
Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in the Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 894 (2009)
(noting the cost of electronic discovery can amount to “tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars” in
typical cases); Michael Orey, Fear of Firing: How the Threat of Litigation Is Making Companies
(Apr.
23,
2007),
Skittish
About
Axing
Problem
Workers,
BUSINESSWEEK
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-04-22/fear-of-firing (noting that it costs $300,000 to
defend a single employment discrimination case through trial).
12. E.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 585–87 (1999); Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998); Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207
(1993).
13. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51,
55 (D.D.C. 1973) (“When it comes to jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly, to paraphrase the
scripture, the Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.”).
14. E.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Laughlin v.
Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1995); Prof’l Managers’ Ass’n v. United States, 761 F.2d
740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
15. E.g., Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 491–92 (1966); Qian A. Gao, Note, “Salvage
Operations Are Ordinarily Preferable to the Wrecking Ball”: Barring Challenges to Subject Matter
Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2369, 2381 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Bruce A. Wagman, Note, Second Bites at the Jurisdictional Apple: A Proposal for
Preventing False Assertions of Diversity of Citizenship, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1417, 1430–32 (1990);
Eric Kades, The Law and Economics of Jurisdiction (William & Mary Law Sch. Research Paper
No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431959.
17. Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492; Gao, supra note 15, at 2371.
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to jurisdiction’s social cost, many of these scholars unfortunately have
been either indifferent or overtly hostile to the important structural
interests underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 18
In this respect, courts and commentators are talking past one another
when it comes to federal jurisdiction. Remarkably, they increasingly
resort to discordant, monistic theories of jurisdictional value, which fail
to consider the full range of interests implicated by jurisdictional rules.19
This is further complicated by the fact that the two sides are talking
about values that are fundamentally incommensurable—there is no
single unit of measurement that we can use to weigh structural values
such as “separation of powers” against efficiency interests such as
“litigation waste.” 20 Indeed, perhaps the most surprising aspect of the
debate on jurisdictional nonwaivability is that it is not a debate at all.
I aim to provoke a real debate on jurisdictional nonwaivability by
advancing two primary claims. First, I argue that jurisdictional values
are inherently pluralistic and multipolar, and that courts and rule makers
should seek equilibrium among values when making jurisdictional rules.
In practice, nonwaivable jurisdictional rules are pluralistic because they
implicate both structural and efficiency values—interests that are
fundamentally incommensurable. Courts and rule makers should not
simply attempt to maximize a single set of jurisdictional values, nor
should they force incommensurable structural and efficiency interests
through a cost-benefit analysis. Instead, they should take a full inventory
of relevant interests, and formulate jurisdictional rules that achieve
equilibrium among those values.
Second, using an equilibration approach, I advance a proposal to
solve jurisdiction’s social cost that accommodates structural and
efficiency values: Federal courts should adjudicate and resolve all
subject-matter jurisdiction questions at the outset of litigation. The rules
should require district courts to affirmatively certify the existence of
jurisdiction in every case; after that point, objections to statutory federal

18. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 366 (1969) [hereinafter ALI STUDY] (labeling jurisdictional nonwaivability a
“fetish”); Dobbs, supra note 15, at 525 (arguing that jurisdictional nonwaivability is “justifiable
only on a radical view of ‘states’ rights’”).
19. Monistic theories consider only one value or, more broadly construed, one homogeneous set
of values. See Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and Balancing,
98 IOWA L. REV. 535, 537 (2013).
20. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a
single metric without doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best
characterized.”).
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jurisdiction would be waived. To further accommodate structural and
efficiency interests, appellate courts should have discretion to
immediately review jurisdictional orders when the benefits of doing so
outweigh the costs. Lastly, federal courts should use the threat of
sanctions to deter private-party abuse of jurisdictional rules.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines a pluralistic theory
of jurisdiction. It examines the dueling monistic theories of jurisdictional
value advanced by courts and commentators. Courts focus on structural
interests; commentators emphasize efficiency concerns. Neither theory
considers a full range of relevant values, and both mask the reality that
jurisdictional values are inherently multipolar and incommensurable. I
conclude that courts and rule makers should adopt an equilibration
approach, adopting rules that achieve equilibrium among all relevant
jurisdictional values.
As part of an equilibration approach, Part II deconstructs the various
structural and efficiency values underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional
rules. Looking first at structural values, I emphasize that separation of
powers and federalism are not as monolithic as they first appear; instead,
federal courts can and must play a key role in asserting federal and
judicial prerogatives in jurisdictional disputes. As for efficiency values, I
attribute jurisdiction’s social cost to several perverse private-party
incentives from nonwaivable jurisdictional rules—those rules induce
plaintiffs to file jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits, motivate defendants to
adopt a wait-and-see approach to jurisdictional litigation, and can even
encourage plaintiffs to belatedly challenge jurisdiction. Worse yet, there
are inadequate incentives for federal courts to ferret out jurisdictional
defects early on in the litigation process.
Finally, Part III outlines my proposal for solving jurisdiction’s social
cost by achieving equilibrium among jurisdictional values. It first offers
a critique of existing proposals to alter nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.
It then outlines a series of changes that would accommodate both
structural and efficiency values, including early jurisdictional rulings, a
cut-off point for jurisdictional objections, interlocutory appeal of
jurisdictional orders, and sanctions to deter abuse by litigants.
I.

A PLURALISTIC THEORY OF JURISDICTION

This Part introduces the core values underlying jurisdictional
nonwaivability, situating my argument within the existing case law and
literature on federal court subject-matter jurisdiction. It shows that
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defenders and critics of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules are largely
talking past one another. Judges tend to frame jurisdiction as a structural
right; 21 many commentators focus primarily on the inefficiency of
nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 22 I contend that this divergence reflects
overly monistic theories of jurisdictional value, which ignore the
pluralistic and incommensurable nature of jurisdictional interests. 23 I
conclude that courts and rule makers should aim for equilibrium among
these pluralistic interests, rather than focusing on a single value set. 24
A.

Structural Values

Federal courts frame jurisdiction in terms of structural values. When
adjudicating jurisdictional issues, they frequently reference federalism, 25
and “the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal
courts.” 26 Courts also emphasize separation-of-powers concerns—
specifically, Congress’s constitutional power to define jurisdictional
boundaries. 27
Judges invoke these structural values as primary justifications for
jurisdictional nonwaivability. 28 They cast their obligation to raise
jurisdictional defects at any time as essential to “the nature and limits of
the judicial power” 29 and “the characterization of the federal
sovereign.” 30 And they insist that inflexible adherence to jurisdictional
restrictions is necessary because jurisdiction is “an essential ingredient
of separation and equilibration of powers.” 31
This rhetoric suggests that federal judges view jurisdictional
nonwaivability as a function of structural rights, rather than individual

21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See infra Part I.D.
25. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1999); Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 505 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law,
404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971).
26. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657–58 (1961); see also Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970) (“Obviously this dual system could not function if
state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.”).
27. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993).
28. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
29. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)
(quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).
30. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702.
31. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
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rights. 32 When a federal court disregards jurisdictional limits, it exercises
power not authorized by the people’s elected representatives, and usurps
state judicial authority over the case. 33 Courts strictly enforce limitations
on their own jurisdiction to guard against such intrusions, thus ensuring
that they remain the “least dangerous branch.” 34
When viewed this way, the nonwaivability of jurisdictional rules
makes sense. In contrast to waivable individual due process rights (such
as objections to personal jurisdiction 35 or the right to notice and a prior
hearing 36), subject-matter jurisdiction protects society at large from
unconstitutional judicial overreach. 37 Thus, in theory, jurisdictional
limitations should not be waivable at the whim of individual litigants.
Among the bench, this notion of jurisdiction-as-structural-right almost
always trumps other considerations, such as efficiency or economic
waste. 38 Courts repeatedly emphasize that jurisdiction is a threshold
requirement, and “no amount of ‘prudential reasons’ or perceived
increases in efficiency” can justify adjudication when jurisdiction does
not exist. 39 Indeed, one judge has even stated the “notion of judicial
efficiency . . . is essentially irrelevant” to jurisdictional analysis in the
federal courts. 40
Admittedly, this sweeping rhetoric is somewhat misleading.
Efficiency concerns are not irrelevant; instead, those interests seep into
32. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and
Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1541–43 (2007) (arguing that federal court subject-matter jurisdiction
is a structural right); see also Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4–5 (2009) (noting that individual rights provide recourse against government
conduct targeting individuals, while structural rights protect all citizens against government conduct
threatening the structure of the democratic system).
33. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3522, at 100, 125–26 (3d ed. 2008).
34. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
35. Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 702–03 (“Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived.”).
36. E.g., D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
37. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 701–02; see also Vladeck, supra note 32, at 1543–44.
38. See, e.g., McBeth v. Himes, 598 F.3d 708, 722 (10th Cir. 2010) (rejecting “the notion that
efficiency for the parties and the court can provide a reason to overlook a jurisdictional
deficiency”).
39. Dow Jones & Co. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Laughlin
v. Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 874 (10th Cir. 1995).
40. Funeral Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 695 F.3d 330, 353 (5th Cir. 2012)
(Clement, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added); see also Prof’l Managers’
Ass’n v. United States, 761 F.2d 740, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that federal courts lack the
power to decide cases for which they have no jurisdiction, regardless of whether doing so would be
efficient).
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judicial opinions on jurisdictional issues from time to time. 41 But, at the
very least, federal court judges still feel the need to hide behind
structural reasoning, if for no other reason than because they believe that
it is the duty of Congress—not the courts—to weigh efficiency interests
in the context of federal jurisdiction. 42
B.

Efficiency Values

In contrast to this emphasis on structural values by federal judges,
many scholars reason from efficiency values and focus on the social cost
of jurisdictional nonwaivability. 43 In particular, commentators point to
the litigation waste resulting from belated jurisdictional dismissals. 44
Because courts must dismiss cases lacking jurisdiction at any time (even
for the first time on appeal), they sometimes dismiss actions on
jurisdictional grounds after the parties have spent hundreds of thousands
of dollars on discovery, motions practice, and perhaps even trial. 45
In addition to criticizing this waste, commentators argue that
nonwaivability converts jurisdictional defects into strategic trump
cards, 46 resulting in needlessly duplicative litigation. Parties with
41. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 315
(2005) (analyzing the effect that an exercise of jurisdiction will have on federal court caseloads, visà-vis “the federal-state division of labor”); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996)
(referring to “considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy” in the context of diversity
jurisdiction).
42. For example, rather than authorizing the full scope of diversity jurisdiction allowable under
Article III, Congress has limited diversity jurisdiction to cases in which there is complete diversity
and a minimum amount in controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). The effect is that federal
district court dockets are more manageable than they otherwise would be under the full scope of
Article III jurisdiction.
43. E.g., Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492 (arguing that jurisdictional nonwaivability is
“inefficient”); Gao, supra note 15, at 2381 (noting that jurisdictional nonwaivability “hinder[s] the
goals of fairness and efficiency”).
44. See, e.g., William Marshall, The “Facts” of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 35
DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 26 (1985) (lamenting the “considerable expense, delay, and inconvenience to
the parties” that results from belated jurisdictional dismissals); H.A. Stephens, Jr., Estoppel to Deny
Federal Jurisdiction—Klee and Di Frischia Break Ground, 68 DICK. L. REV. 39, 40 (1963)
(observing that nonwaivable jurisdictional rules incur an “incalculable waste of time, effort, energy,
and money”); Wagman, supra note 16, at 1432 (arguing that “shifting cases to state courts after
substantial progress has been made is costly and duplicative”); Kades, supra note 16, at 1 (noting
that when a case is dismissed, “all of the resources expended by the parties and society in the
adjudication are rendered worthless”).
45. E.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt., 497 F. App’x 313, 315–18 (4th Cir. 2012)
(appellate court vacated summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds, after more than two years of
litigation); Firstenberg v. City of Santa Fe, 696 F.3d 1018, 1020 (10th Cir. 2012) (appellate court
noticed jurisdictional defect after the parties had already completed a full round of briefing).
46. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492; Gao, supra note 15, at 2371.
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knowledge of a jurisdictional defect can remain silent, choosing to raise
the defect only if they receive an unfavorable result on the merits, in
order to wipe the slate clean. 47 Nothing prevents a party who invoked
jurisdiction at the outset of litigation from attacking jurisdiction after
suffering an adverse decision on the merits. 48 Thus, nonwaivable
jurisdictional rules can incentivize strategically inefficient behavior.
Of course, this focus on efficiency does not mean that scholars have
ignored structural values. Commentators frequently point out that federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 49 and often refer in passing to
the structural interests that animate nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.50 In
particular, Michael Collins suggests that a focus on the efficiency of
jurisdictional rules risks compromising essential structural values, and
“seems calculated more toward guaranteeing a lack of care in the
invocation of jurisdiction and in the courts’ consideration of it than
toward the conservation of any significant resources.” 51
That said, much of the existing scholarship on jurisdictional
nonwaivability is largely indifferent—if not overtly hostile—to
structural values. Although a few scholars attempt to harmonize
structural and efficiency values,52 others are not so kind. Dan Dobbs has
argued that nonwaivable jurisdictional rules produce “egregiously bad
results” that “no high-minded talk of states’ rights or limited judicial
power can obscure.” 53 And the American Law Institute has labeled
jurisdictional nonwaivability a “fetish” that is “wholly inconsistent with
sound judicial administration” and that “can only serve to diminish
respect for a system that tolerates it.” 54

47. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 15, at 492; Gao, supra note 15, at 2371.
48. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 7–8, 16–18 (1951) (defendant removed
the case from state court to federal court, lost at trial, then successfully argued that the federal court
lacked jurisdiction); Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. 126, 126–27 (1804) (plaintiff invoked federal
court diversity jurisdiction, lost at trial, then successfully raised a jurisdictional defect).
49. See, e.g., Stephens, supra note 44, at 39; Gao, supra note 15, at 2372.
50. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 44, at 25; Kades, supra note 16, at 1.
51. Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1895 (2007).
52. See, e.g., id. at 1883 (suggesting that, at least historically, jurisdictional waivability appears
to be compatible with constitutional and statutory limits on federal jurisdiction); Gao, supra note 15,
at 2401–02 (insisting that her proposal for an early cut-off of jurisdictional challenges would not
offend federalism concerns).
53. Dobbs, supra note 15, at 524–25. Professor Dobbs does not pull punches. He argues that
nonwaivable jurisdictional rules are “justifiable only on a radical view of ‘states’ rights’,” id. at 525,
and are based on “a misconceived notion, surely inherited from the Middle Ages, that it would be
insulting for federal courts to try cases ‘belonging’ to state courts.” Id. at 529.
54. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 366; see also Dobbs, supra note 15, at 524.
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Problems Presented by the Structural-Efficiency Dichotomy

I argue that these divergent structural and efficiency rationales reflect
overly monistic theories of jurisdictional value, which fail to consider
the full range of interests implicated by jurisdictional rules.55 I also
contend that the fractured dialogue among judges and commentators
masks a significant obstacle for efforts to solve jurisdiction’s social cost:
Many of the values underlying federal jurisdiction are fundamentally
incommensurable, and cannot be weighed out through a cost-benefit
analysis. 56
1.

Value Monism

Theories about law are either monistic or pluralistic. Monistic theories
consider only one value or, more broadly construed, one homogeneous
set of values. 57 The aim is to avoid the need to balance conflicting
interests. 58 In contrast, pluralistic theories consider multiple competing
interests. 59 Although pluralism can take many specific forms, 60 the
overriding goal of a pluralistic approach is to balance several relevant
values, rather than focusing on a single value set. 61
By homing in on a single set of values, defenders and critics of
jurisdictional nonwaivability advance competing monistic theories of
jurisdictional value. 62 As demonstrated above, judges invoke structural
interests when discussing nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, but usually
refuse to consider efficiency values. 63 Scholars focus on efficiency
interests, often neglecting structural values.64 Thus, each group has a
55. See infra Part I.C.1.
56. See infra Part I.C.2.
57. See Burton, supra note 19, at 537; Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of
Incommensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412 (2001) (observing that “monism is
implicated any time an adjudicative choice is reduced to a single dimension”).
58. Burton, supra note 19, at 537. For example, methods of constitutional interpretation such as
formalism or originalism often rely on a single inquiry or value, to the exclusion of other
considerations. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1412–13.
59. Burton, supra note 19, at 537.
60. See id. at 544–45, 544 n.20 (distinguishing several varieties of pluralism).
61. Id. at 537. For example, some scholars have advanced pluralistic methods for constitutional
interpretation, which draw on multiple principles or sources. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffen,
Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1753, 1762–67 (1994).
62. Neither side identifies its theories as monistic. Nonetheless, I contend that structural and
efficiency theories of jurisdictional nonwaivability “have monistic ambitions,” even if “they are
unspoken.” Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1413.
63. See supra notes 25–42 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 43–54 and accompanying text.
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tendency to default to a single value set, at the exclusion of other
relevant interests. 65
Monistic theories are problematic in this context for at least two
reasons. First, jurisdictional values are plural, not singular. The
application of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules implicates both structural
and efficiency values. Neither litigants nor courts can ignore
constitutional or statutory restrictions on subject-matter jurisdiction
when it would be efficient to do so. And even if a belated jurisdictional
dismissal accommodates structural values, it does not absolve the parties
of their sunk litigation costs. Simply put, monistic theories do not reflect
jurisdictional reality.
Second, these monistic theories are problematic because they
inevitably lead courts and commentators to seek maximization of a
single value set, while ignoring other relevant considerations. 66 In the
context of jurisdictional rules, the implicit goal of both sides appears to
be maximization. Courts maximize structural values by insisting on
nonwaivability. 67 Commentators maximize efficiency values by
proposing jurisdictional cut-off points at an early stage of litigation. 68
Neither side is considering all relevant values.
In a sense, existing monistic approaches to jurisdictional value are
analogous to baking a cake with either dry ingredients or wet
ingredients, but not both. Maximizing only one value set while ignoring
the other ruins the cake. Likewise, monistic theories of jurisdictional
value are undesirable because they fail to consider all interests
implicated by nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.

65. Although I cast each of the two relevant value sets (structural values and efficiency values)
as monistic and homogenous, several sub-interests admittedly comprise each set of values, and
those sub-interests may be in conflict at times. Within Article III structural values, for example, a
specific jurisdictional rule may accommodate separation-of-powers concerns while still offending
notions of federalism. I do not mean to suggest that structural and efficiency values are incapable of
sub-categorization; instead, my point here is that judges and critics primarily resort to two
different—and sometimes conflicting—value sets when discussing nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.
66. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1412 (“Maximization is an almost necessary corollary of
monism: if there is only one relevant value, then it is difficult to imagine a persuasive reason for
choosing any option other than the one that will maximize the realizations of that value.”).
67. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975).
68. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64 (proposing that parties be required to raise
jurisdictional issues before “the commencement of trial on the merits” or, alternatively, before a
“decision . . . that is dispositive of the merits”); Gao, supra note 15, at 2405 (proposing that
jurisdictional challenges be foreclosed when “the initial pleadings, answers, and motions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 have been made”).
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Incommensurability

In addition to the trappings of maximization, existing monistic
theories of jurisdictional value assume away problems associated with
incommensurability. 69 I argue that jurisdictional values are not only
pluralistic; they are to some degree incommensurable—structural and
efficiency values are not always capable of being reduced to (or
measured by) a common value or metric. Because some jurisdictional
values are incommensurable, we cannot weigh them out through costbenefit analysis. We must use a different approach.
At the risk of oversimplification, values are commensurable if they
can be expressed in terms of a single, common value or metric. 70
Obviously, many goods are commensurable because we can reduce their
worth to dollars. 71 Some metrics—such as inches and centimeters—
provide different ways to measure a particular value, and are
commensurable because we can express one metric in terms of the
other. 72
But other values or items are irreducible in terms of a common
metric, and are thus incommensurable. Examples include weight and
length; 73 a career in the law versus a career as a clarinetist; 74 a Mozart
concerto versus one of Bob Dylan’s hit albums; 75 and the choice
between hiking in England and riding horses in Kentucky. 76 In each of
these pairings, there is no common, all-encompassing value that fully
expresses all considerations that would be relevant to a choice between
the two options. 77
Incommensurability does not mean we should refuse to choose
between our options, however. Rational choice is possible among
incommensurable values. 78 After all, some law school graduates choose

69. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1413.
70. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 796. See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY,
AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Matthew Alder, Law and Incommensurability,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998).
71. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law,
in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 70, at 238.
72. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1390.
73. Id. at 1391.
74. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 332 (1986).
75. See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 799–800.
76. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 240.
77. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1390.
78. E.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1019
(2011); Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
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careers as clarinetists, and some clarinetists choose careers as lawyers.79
Within the law, legislators, judges, and rule makers often must choose
among two or more incommensurable values. 80 When deciding among
plural, incommensurable values, the goal should be a rationally
defensible choice, supported by reasoning that is persuasive to others. 81
Admittedly, these choices will be uncertain and debatable to some
extent, given that there is no common metric that we can use to
definitively compare incommensurable values.82 As several
commentators have argued, however, we should recognize and embrace
these uncertainties, rather than forcing incommensurable values through
a one-dimensional cost-benefit analysis, which can have difficulty
measuring unquantifiable effects. 83
The interests underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability illustrate the
challenges associated with incommensurable values. There is no single,
common value that can fully express all considerations relevant to a
choice between structural values (such as federalism and separation of
powers) and efficiency values (such as a desire to avoid litigation
waste). 84 For example, many efficiency values can be reduced to a
monetary amount; at least some structural values likely cannot.85 And
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1259 (1998).
79. For example, lawyer/clarinetist Paul Green turned down the co-principal clarinet position
with the Jerusalem Symphony Orchestra in order to attend law school; after several years as a
practicing attorney and law professor at Brooklyn Law School, he returned to a full-time career as a
clarinetist. About Paul Green, PAULGREENMUSIC.COM, http://www.paulgreenmusic.com/aboutpaulgreen.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2013). Incommensurability of the values underlying these
careers did not prevent him from choosing between the two—not once, but twice.
80. See Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1410–11.
81. See id. at 1383; Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (insisting that “despite the incommensurability of values, rational
choice remains possible through reasoned deliberation,” including “non-deductive, non-algorithmic
reflection” that is “both principled and contextual,” and that draws upon “critical judgment,
tradition, experience, and discernment.”).
82. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1404.
83. For critiques of cost-benefit analysis based on problems associated with
incommensurability, see, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Liza Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: CostBenefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553, 1563–64 (2002);
Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971, 986–89
(2000).
84. Indeed, there may not even be a common value or metric that we can use to fully compare
sub-categories of each value set. For example, how does one measure effects on federalism versus
effects on separation of powers?
85. Arguably, some structural values underlying federal jurisdiction can be quantified and
weighed under a metric commensurable with efficiency values. For example, Judge Richard Posner
has used economic analysis to examine the optimal scope of federal jurisdiction. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 273–303 (1996). As Judge Posner
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although consideration for the proper role of federal courts within the
American system of government is a common thread among structural
values, 86 efficiency values are likely agnostic to such concerns. In this
way, jurisdictional values are incommensurable. 87
In light of the incommensurability of these values, it would be futile
to use a cost-benefit analysis to sort out the advantages and
disadvantages of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. 88 Suppose that we
were able to quantify the average efficiency gains that would result from
making jurisdictional restrictions waivable at the whim of the parties,
reducing those gains to a dollar amount. Even if this were possible, how
would we weigh these monetary efficiency gains against structural
values that are decidedly nonmonetary in nature? 89 For example, if
waivable jurisdictional rules would save a federal court litigant $5,000
on average, does that outweigh the corresponding incursion on
federalism values that would result from federal courts hearing disputes
that belong in the state court system? 90
A cost-benefit analysis between these incommensurable values is
difficult, if not impossible. 91 Revisiting the cake analogy above,
weighing incommensurable jurisdictional values would be akin to
weighing the costs of a half-cup more sugar versus the benefits of a halfhour more baking time. Although both sugar and baking time are

himself admits, however, not all structural sub-values can be analyzed in this way. See id. at 275
(“Although my discussion will be in a scientific spirit, I emphasize that the relation between the
states and the federal government cannot be regarded solely as an expedient one . . . .”).
86. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Federal Courts, Cases and Materials, 83 HARV. L. REV.
1753, 1754 (1970) (book review).
87. Note that I argue that these values are incommensurable, not that they are incomparable.
The absence of a single value or metric to fully express structural and efficiency interests does not
mean there is no basis for rational comparison between those interests. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 973 (1987) (“Competing interests
are not, by definition, incomparable. Apples and oranges can be placed on a fruit scale or assigned a
price in dollars per pound.”).
88. See Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 83, at 1563–64; Richardson, supra note 83, at
986–89.
89. See, e.g., John M. Heyde, Comment, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble?, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 331, 353 (1995) (noting “that monetary values, when encouraged by the law, tend to
drive out other important, nonmonetary values”).
90. See Kades, supra note 16, at 1, 3 (referencing cost-benefit analysis as a potential tool for
evaluating the desirability of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, but declining to weigh structural and
efficiency values).
91. This difficulty is consistent with the tendency among scholars to identify the interests
underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, while declining to resolve the tension between those
interests. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 51, at 1895; Marshall, supra note 44, at 25–26; Stephens,
supra note 44, at 39–40.
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important values, they affect the cake in fundamentally different ways.
There is no direct trade-off between these values, rendering cost-benefit
analysis and other weighing approaches unhelpful.
D.

The Search for Equilibrium Among Competing Values

How then can we reason about—and resolve—conflicts among
jurisdictional values? In light of the inadequacy of maximization and
weighing approaches, I argue that courts and rule makers must take a
full inventory of relevant jurisdictional interests, and seek equilibrium
among those values. This new approach recognizes that jurisdictional
values are both pluralistic and incommensurable, and would ensure that
jurisdictional rules more accurately reflect the true nature of the various
interests at play.
Initially, we must resist the temptation to force jurisdictional values
through a bipolar constitutional balancing test.92 When considering the
scope of constitutional rights, courts tend to use balancing mechanisms
that weigh an individual’s right against the countervailing costs (usually
the interests of the government). 93 This type of balancing is essentially a
two-dimensional exercise in constrained maximization: it aims to
maximize individual rights subject to any corresponding governmental
interests that outweigh those rights. 94
Bipolar balancing is problematic for resolving conflicts among
jurisdictional values, however, because those conflicts tend to be
multipolar in nature. 95 In each case, consideration of jurisdictional issues
can implicate a plurality of interests. First, the adjudication of
jurisdictional issues obviously affects the benefits and costs of the
parties before the court, as well as the court itself. 96 Second, any
92. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1466
(2013) (noting that Article III “implies a ‘bipolar model of the lawsuit, which assumes a dispute
between two unitary, diametrically opposed interests,’ rather than ‘a multipolar model in which the
party structure is sprawling and amorphous’” (quoting Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 227, 250 (1990))).
93. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262–63 (1970); see also Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV.
789, 792 n.8 (2007) (noting that balancing “applies across the spectrum of constitutional rights”).
94. See Huq, supra note 92, at 1469 (“In individual rights matters, a judge’s core task involves
balancing an individual’s constitutional privilege against the aggregated interests of society at large
as represented by the government.”).
95. I do not contend that conflicts in jurisdictional values cannot be bipolar in nature; instead, I
argue that most conflicts between these values are multipolar, implicating more than two broad
categories of interests.
96. Kades, supra note 16, at 1 (identifying the litigation costs that accompany jurisdictional
rules); see also Dustin E. Buehler, Jurisdictional Incentives, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 105, 128–32
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decision on jurisdiction that is binding or persuasive authority would
affect nonparty incentives as well. 97 Third, the decision by a federal
court to exercise (or not exercise) jurisdiction can affect the interests of a
multitude of institutional actors—i.e., Congress’s role in demarcating
jurisdictional limits; 98 the delicate “federal balance” between state and
federal governments; 99 and perhaps even a desire by one or more
branches of the federal government to control the path of adjudication or
limit judicial review. 100
Because jurisdictional values are multipolar, our goal should be
equilibration, not maximization. 101 Rather than maximizing particular
interests or weighing values on a bipolar scale, courts and rule makers
must promulgate jurisdictional rules by juggling a complex set of
values. 102 Initially, they should take a full inventory of the relevant
interests at play. 103 They then should formulate a rule that achieves
equilibrium among these values. 104 The goal is to find a rule that honors
and accommodates all values, rather than maximizing one value set at
the expense of another.
As an alternative way to think of this equilibrium approach, I
appropriate a metaphor that Brett Scharffs has invoked in the context of
reasoning about incommensurables—the metaphor of a recipe. 105
Professor Scharffs notes that choices that encompass all relevant values
implicitly rely on judgments as to “which values should be combined in
(2012) (discussing how personal jurisdiction rules alter private-party benefits and costs).
97. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit
Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 227 (1999) (identifying the
precedential value of judicial decisions as a public benefit of suit).
98. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
99. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
JENNA BEDNAR, THE ROBUST FEDERATION: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 68–69 (Stephen Ansolabehere
et. al. eds., 2009) (noting that federalism implicates various types of behavioral incentives among
state and federal actors).
100. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786–92 (2008).
101. Cf. Huq, supra note 92, at 1471–72 (noting that when the Supreme Court adjudicates
structural issues, it “aims to strike an equilibrium among the branches,” rather than maximizing the
power or interests of any one branch).
102. See id.
103. See Aleinikoff, supra note 87, at 977.
104. Ideally, this process would generate a jurisdictional rule that would apply across the board
to all cases, eliminating the need for an ad hoc case-by-case balancing of jurisdictional values, and
enhancing certainty. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT §§ 2.02–2.03 (1992) (contrasting “definitional” and “ad
hoc” balancing).
105. Scharffs, supra note 57, at 1420–22.
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what proportions to achieve an ideal of the type under consideration.” 106
This dovetails nicely with our cake analogy:
[J]ust as baking a good cake will not be a matter of putting in as
much of each ingredient as possible, reaching an [all things
considered] judgment will involve not an attempt to maximize
as many of the relevant values as possible, but rather will
involve an effort to find or fashion a solution that will result in
the proper mixture of values in the proper quantities. There may
also be analogies to matters of timing and technique that are
relevant to following a recipe. 107
Thus, when reasoning about jurisdiction, it may be useful to view the
underlying values as ingredients, and the optimal jurisdictional rule as a
carefully refined recipe that combines those ingredients.
Fortunately, judges are familiar with this type of approach. To some
extent, courts already balance multipolar interests and seek equilibrium
when resolving conflicts between structural values.108 For example, the
Supreme Court’s description of both separation of powers and
federalism suggests that it aims for equilibration of the component
interests. 109
And yet, I do not pretend that it will be easy for courts to adopt an
equilibration approach in the jurisdictional context. I anticipate two
primary criticisms of the approach that I describe here. First, some may
say that the process of describing component values and seeking
equilibration among those interests is inherently subjective and
untethered. 110 Although I agree equilibration of jurisdictional values
106. Id. at 1421.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (using
a multipolar balancing test to assess the constitutionality of legislative courts); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974) (rejecting absolute presidential immunity from judicial
process, in part because of a “confrontation with other [separation-of-powers] values”).
109. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Separation of powers . . . operates on a horizontal axis to secure a proper balance of legislative,
executive, and judicial authority.”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other level
of Government has tipped the scales too far.”); see also Benjamin R. Civiletti, The Attorney
General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 OP. ATT’Y
GEN. 275, 276 (1980) (describing separation of powers as “the equilibrium established within our
constitutional system”).
110. Commentators already have raised this objection in response to courts’ tendency to seek
equilibration among structural values. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1194 (2000) (arguing that, in the context of
separation of powers, “[w]e do not know what ‘balance’ means, and we do not know how it is
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cannot produce a single answer with absolute certainty, 111 it is not my
intention to do so. Instead, my goal is to let the debate begin—to
encourage a dialogue among courts and scholars that considers the full
range of jurisdictional values, with the shared goal of improving
jurisdictional rules.
Second, the approach I advocate here undoubtedly is contrary to the
traditional notion of rigid, inflexible jurisdictional rules. As a result,
some will point out that this simply is not how jurisdiction works. 112
Indeed, it is possible that this line of attack would lead courts and
commentators to reject an equilibration approach out of hand. 113
That said, I am not convinced that jurisdiction is as unyielding as
some suggest. After all, judicially-created limitations exist that restrict
the invocation of jurisdictional defects—most notably, litigants cannot
collaterally attack the jurisdictional basis of a final judgment. 114
Additionally, during the first century of the Republic, federal jurisdiction
was malleable, and waivable by the parties in some instances. 115 During
that time, federal courts relied on the pleadings to determine the
existence of jurisdiction, 116 and it was relatively easy for parties to
manipulate federal jurisdiction through collusion. 117 And to the extent
that our modern mandatory and rigid jurisdictional norms are grounded

achieved or maintained”).
111. Stated another way, multiple equilibria may be possible in the context of jurisdictional
rules—several different combinations of jurisdictional values may produce a stable (and perhaps
even desirable) jurisdictional rule.
112. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Hybridizing Jurisdiction, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2011)
(noting that courts and commentators repeatedly reference the unbending nature of jurisdictional
rules, “entrench[ing] the idea of jurisdiction as a rigid antipode to nonjurisdictional law”); Laura S.
Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2001) (“The Supreme
Court has always declared subject matter jurisdiction an absolute precondition to the exercise of
federal judicial power.”).
113. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (describing subjectmatter jurisdiction as “inflexible and without exception” (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v.
Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884))); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)
(same).
114. Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12 (1982).
115. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–40; Fitzgerald, supra note 112, at 1245–73.
116. Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–40; see also Sheppard v. Graves, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 505,
510 (1853) (noting that “wherever jurisdiction shall be averred in the pleadings, . . . it must be taken
primâ facie as existing”).
117. Common law procedures traditionally required the defendant to file a plea in abatement in
order to contest jurisdiction. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–39. A defendant’s failure to do so
was tantamount to waiver of the jurisdictional objection. Id. at 1839.
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in the commands of constitutional language, 118 federal courts have
shown a willingness to adopt multifaceted balancing approaches in
similar contexts. 119
II.

DECONSTRUCTING JURISDICTIONAL VALUES

For these reasons, courts should adopt a pluralistic approach to
jurisdictional questions, and should aim for equilibration among values,
rather than using a categorical, monistic approach. In this Part, I
catalogue the various values implicated by nonwaivable jurisdictional
rules. Using the recipe metaphor, this Part provides our mise en
place 120—a set of ingredients federal judges and rule makers should
draw on when refining an optimal jurisdictional recipe.
I start by analyzing structural values underlying jurisdictional rules,
including separation-of-powers and federalism concerns. 121 I then
examine the efficiency interests implicated by jurisdictional
nonwaivability. 122
A.

Delineating Structural Values

Federal court jurisdiction under Article III implicates “the two great
structural principles of the Constitution—federalism and separation of
powers.” 123 Courts tend to treat these two structural value sets as
monolithic, deferring to the legislative prerogatives of Congress when
discussing separation-of-powers values, and to the prerogatives of states
when considering federalism values.
These structural values are not so simple, however. In reality, the
structural values underlying jurisdictional rules are decidedly pluralistic.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
119. Judicial interpretation of the First Amendment provides an example of courts’ willingness
to depart from seemingly absolute constitutional language. Although the Constitution states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,” U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added), the Supreme Court has used several multifaceted tests for determining whether
government conduct violates the Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (applying endorsement test); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (providing a three-pronged test for Establishment Clause violations).
120. See MARGUERITE-MARIE DUBOIS, DICTIONNAIRE FRANÇAIS ANGLAIS 477 (1981)
(defining “mise en place” as “placing, putting, setting”); Pete Wells, Cooking with Dexter: Prep
School, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 14, 2010, at 40 (noting that “mise en place” refers “to the practice
of having all the ingredients and tools set to go before you even light the stove”).
121. See infra Part II.A.
122. See infra Part II.B.
123. Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 205 (1985).
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I argue that separation-of-powers values include two discrete sets of subvalues, one focused on legislative prerogatives and the other on judicial
prerogatives. 124 Similarly, in the context of jurisdictional rules,
federalism implicates interests vital to states and the federal government;
both Congress and the federal courts play essential roles in identifying
and demarcating relevant sub-values. 125
1.

Separation of Powers: Legislative and Judicial Prerogatives

In the jurisdictional context, judicial rhetoric casts separation of
powers as a one-dimensional value: the role of the courts is to merely
respect and effectuate jurisdictional boundaries, as defined by Congress.
Federal judges repeatedly stress they are powerless to hear cases and
controversies outside of their jurisdiction, 126 and point to Congress’s
broad power over such matters. 127 They also insist that transcending
jurisdictional boundaries would amount to judicial usurpation of the
federal constitutional design. 128 Taken at face value, these statements
suggest separation of powers is a one-way street: legislative prerogatives
trump all other considerations, and Congress alone gets to decide which
cases federal courts hear.
This conventional notion of separation of powers is somewhat
incomplete, however. Nonwaivable jurisdictional rules implicate at least
two discrete separation-of-powers sub-values: legislative prerogatives to
demarcate jurisdictional boundaries, and judicial prerogatives to
preserve the essential role of federal courts.
Congress clearly has broad power over federal jurisdiction.129 It has
significant power to curtail or eliminate the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, 130 and has wide power over the jurisdiction of the lower
124. See infra Part II.A.1.
125. See infra Part II.A.2.
126. E.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); United States v.
Pomales-Lebron, 513 F.3d 262, 269 (1st Cir. 2008); Orff v. United States, 358 F.3d 1137, 1149 (9th
Cir. 2004); Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767, 769 (11th Cir. 1984).
127. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Lockerty v. Phillips,
319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
128. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 515 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fed. Mar. Bd. v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 523 n.8 (1958).
129. Many scholars have emphasized this point over the years. See, e.g., Paul Bator,
Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1037–41
(1982); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 917–22 (1984); Herbert
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965).
130. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869).
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federal courts. 131 As one judge has noted, “[w]hen it comes to
jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly, to paraphrase the scripture, the
Congress giveth, and the Congress taketh away.” 132 Thus, Congress
arguably is the only institutional actor with the ability to consider the
policy interests underlying jurisdictional rules—i.e., litigation incentives,
litigation waste, and the allocation of cases between state and federal
courts.
Congressional power over federal jurisdiction is not unlimited,
however. 133 Legislative demarcation of jurisdictional boundaries must
comply with constitutional provisions external to Article III, such as the
Due Process Clause and Suspension Clause.134 Several scholars also
have argued that Congress cannot limit jurisdiction in a way that
interferes with the essential role of the federal courts in the constitutional
design. 135 Moreover, federal judges retain at least some control over the
parameters of their own jurisdiction—for example, judicially-created
abstention doctrines allow courts to stay or dismiss cases for which
jurisdiction exists. 136
Thus, in reality, separation of powers is a two-way street, and it
would be inaccurate to frame jurisdictional values as exclusively rooted
in legislative prerogatives. Jurisdiction implicates values important to
the judiciary as well—something that federal judges explicitly recognize

131. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (stating that “Congress may
withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies,” and
that “[c]ourts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).
132. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55
(D.D.C. 1973).
133. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364–65 (1953) (rejecting the notion that
Congress has plenary control over federal jurisdiction).
134. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771–92 (2008) (holding that Congress must
comply with the requirements of the Suspension Clause when limiting federal court review of
enemy combatant determinations by Combatant Status Review Tribunals); Battaglia v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) (“[T]he exercise by Congress of its control over jurisdiction
is subject to compliance with at least the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.”).
135. E.g., Hart, supra note 133, at 1365; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 201–02 (1960). Some have
even suggested that Article III obligates Congress to vest some federal court with jurisdiction over
certain cases. E.g., Amar, supra note 123, at 206; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 741, 749–50 (1984); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498, 532–33 (1974).
136. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 783 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that
abstention doctrines are “judicially created rules” that allow federal courts to avoid deciding some
matters “even though all jurisdictional and justiciability requirements are met”).
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from time to time, particularly when pushing back against legislative
efforts to circumscribe meaningful judicial review. 137 Granted, judges
often assert judicial prerogatives subtly, framing their interests in ways
that appear consistent with the prerogatives of other branches. 138 But my
underlying point remains true: separation-of-powers values are
multifaceted in the jurisdictional context. Both Congress and federal
courts have skin in the game, and also the ability to craft jurisdictional
rules.
2.

Federalism: State and Federal Prerogatives

Judicial opinions on jurisdictional issues also have a tendency to cast
federalism as a one-dimensional value. When discussing the
implications of subject-matter jurisdiction, federal courts tend to
emphasize state prerogatives, sometimes ignoring the interests of the
federal government in the process. 139 The opinions that do reference
federal interests frequently stress that Congress is the only actor that can
define and assert those interests in our federal system. 140
State interests certainly are important. States have an interest in their
own courts being able to hear disputes without undue interference by
federal courts. 141 Additionally, as Richard Fallon notes, one of the major
premises of a Federalist model of federal jurisdiction is that “[s]tate
courts are constitutionally as competent as federal courts to adjudicate
137. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771–92 (striking down the Detainee Treatment Act,
partly on separation-of-powers grounds); In re Nat’l Sec. Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1077 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (holding that the National Security Letter statute violates separation-of-powers principles
because it “attempts to circumscribe a court’s ability to review the necessity of nondisclosure
orders”).
138. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 173–77 (1803) (refusing to issue a writ of
mandamus to Marbury on jurisdictional grounds, while establishing the power of judicial review);
see also Robert J. Reinstein & Mark C. Rahdert, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729,
771 (2005) (“As generations of American law students have learned, [Chief Justice] Marshall and
his Court may have ‘lost the battle’ over Marbury’s commission, but they ‘won the war’ of judicial
power by advancing the principle of judicial review.”).
139. See, e.g., Anderson v. H&R Block, Inc., 287 F.3d 1038, 1041 (11th Cir. 2002) (referencing
“the states’ authority to resolve disputes in their own courts,” but not interests associated with
federal courts’ authority to resolve disputes), rev’d on other grounds, 539 U.S. 1 (2003). But see In
re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1098 (1980) (stating that under the federalism inquiry, courts must give
“due regard for the constitutional allocation of powers between the state and federal systems”).
140. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (noting that
congressional limitations on federal jurisdiction “must be neither disregarded nor evaded”); Chase
Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that federal courts
can adjudicate only those claims “that have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant by
Congress”).
141. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941).
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federal issues.” 142 To some extent, conveyance of jurisdiction to federal
courts implies the opposite—that state courts are inadequate. 143 In this
way, federal jurisdiction unquestionably implicates state interests.
Much like separation-of-powers concerns, however, federalism values
are not monolithic. Legislative conveyance of federal court
jurisdiction 144—as well as statutory authorization for removal of cases
from state to federal court 145—reflects Congress’s judgment that
significant federal interests justify the availability of a federal forum. 146
And at times it can even reflect Congress’s conclusion that federal courts
provide a superior forum for the adjudication of certain matters. 147
Moreover, Congress is not the only federal actor that defines this
federal interest. Courts also play an essential role in asserting and
evaluating federal interests, sometimes at the expense of state court
jurisdiction. For example, the judicially developed test for evaluating
whether a state law claim presents a federal question explicitly requires a
“substantial” and “serious federal interest.” 148 Conversely, the Supreme
Court has cited state interests underlying federalism as the primary
reason for its occasional abstention from exercising jurisdiction that
otherwise exists. 149
142. Richard H. Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1153
(1988).
143. Section 1983—creating a claim for violations of federal constitutional rights by state
actors—is perhaps the most telling example of a congressional judgment that state courts are (or at
least can be) inadequate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972)
(“The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people,
as guardians of the people’s federal rights . . . .”).
144. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2012) (jurisdiction for actions against foreign states); id.
§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); id. § 1333 (admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2012) (providing for removal of civil actions).
146. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS 28 (1995), reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 49 (1996) (encouraging Congress to vest
federal courts with jurisdiction over civil cases only when it “further[s] clearly defined and justified
federal interests”).
147. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (vesting federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction
over copyright and patent claims). I do not mean to wade too far into the literature on federal and
state court parity here. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 278–83 (6th ed. 2009) (citing literature and empirical
studies on parity). As I have argued elsewhere, the structure of the Constitution—specifically
Congress’s power to establish or not establish lower federal courts—seems to assume that parity
can exist, while delegating judgment on matters of parity to Congress. See Dustin E. Buehler,
Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doctrine to State Court Interlocutory Orders, 36 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 373, 398–99 (2009).
148. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005).
149. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1984).
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In other words, much like separation of powers, federalism is a twoway street. It implicates both state prerogatives and federal
prerogatives. 150 Furthermore, the legislative branch does not have a
monopoly on defining federal interests—instead, both Congress and the
federal judiciary play key roles in identifying and guarding the federal
government’s prerogatives. 151
3.

Working with Structural Values

Any attempt to incorporate the full scope of these values into a new
approach to jurisdiction begs the question: How do we work with these
structural ingredients, and how rigid or malleable are they? I make a few
observations here that will be relevant to the discussion below.
First, jurisdictional values are more flexible than they appear—we can
mitigate many structural concerns by using Congress as the actor for
reform. 152 By vesting Congress with broad power over federal
jurisdiction, the Constitution arguably gives the legislative branch
discretion to demarcate an optimal balance between state and federal
courts. 153 Moreover, as long as jurisdictional rules do not interfere with
the essential role of the federal courts, they incorporate separation-ofpowers values by fully respecting both legislative and judicial
prerogatives. 154
Second, federal courts can (and already do) play a key role in
ensuring that jurisdictional rules are flexible and accommodate federal
prerogatives. For example, federal courts have grafted the “legal
certainty” test onto the statutory amount-in-controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction, 155 and impose a “time of filing” rule for assessing

150. See Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST. COMMENT.
339, 349 (2010) (“Respect for federalism does not mean that state interests should always trump
federal interests; rather, it requires fair consideration of and deliberation about state interests.”).
151. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of
Judicial Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 121–22 (2004) (arguing that courts are
often in a better position than Congress to assert and evaluate federalism interests). But see LARRY
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 131, 135 (2004) (arguing that courts should have minimal
involvement in federalism issues).
152. Alternatively, Congress can pass a law delegating rulemaking authority to another entity.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012) (delegating procedural rulemaking authority to the Supreme
Court).
153. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 147, at 7–9 (recounting the history of the Madisonian
Compromise, under which Congress can choose whether to create lower federal courts).
154. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
155. See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938).
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the citizenship of the parties. 156 Under these judge-made rules, diversity
jurisdiction exists as long as the complaint pleads a jurisdictionally
sufficient amount, and as long as diversity of citizenship existed at the
time plaintiff commenced her action—even when the amount later
proves to be insufficient or the parties change their citizenship.157 Both
rules show federal courts’ willingness to put a judicial gloss on
jurisdictional statutes when there is good reason to do so.
Third, there is an outer limit to the flexibility of jurisdictional rules—
at some point we run up against structural concerns that trump other
considerations. Most notably, although Congress could make statutory
jurisdictional requirements waivable, it probably cannot render
constitutional requirements waivable. 158 And even if that were possible,
jurisdictional waivability at some point would violate separation-ofpowers notions by encroaching on essential judicial prerogatives. 159 For
example, if jurisdiction were completely waivable at the whim of the
parties, then a party’s waiver of jurisdictional defects could possibly
insulate important Article III questions from judicial review.
Ultimately, there are two key take-away points here. First, our current
police-jurisdiction-at-all-costs approach fails to consider the full
implications of structural values underlying jurisdictional rules. Second,
a completely passive judicial approach (allowing unlimited private-party
waiver of jurisdiction) is problematic as well. Jurisdictional rules must
be more flexible, but courts must stay involved.
B.

Unpacking Efficiency Values

Having examined structural values, I now turn to the efficiency values
underlying nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. In doing so, I provide one
of the first economic analyses of jurisdiction’s social cost. 160 First, I
outline the goal of an efficiency approach: socially optimal jurisdictional
rules. 161 I then describe the various private-party incentives underlying
156. See Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539–40 (1824).
157. RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 184, 188 (2d ed. 2009).
158. I say “probably” here because some have made the argument that “the ‘necessary and
proper’ clause of the Constitution gives Congress power to avoid wasteful burdens on the courts by
setting a time limit for raising [constitutional] jurisdictional questions.” 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 33, § 3522, at 137; see also Dobbs, supra note 15, at 520–21. But see Collins, supra note 51, at
1888 (questioning the validity of this argument).
159. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
160. My analysis builds on an excellent paper by Eric Kades, which examines various
incentives underlying jurisdictional rules. See Kades, supra note 16.
161. See infra Part II.B.1.
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jurisdictional rules. 162 I contend that nonwaivable jurisdictional rules
incentivize inefficient behavior by both plaintiffs and defendants.
Finally, I note that federal judges have inadequate incentives to police
their own jurisdiction early on in many cases. 163
1.

The Goal: Socially Optimal Jurisdictional Rules

From an efficiency standpoint, jurisdictional rules are socially optimal
if they encourage procedural litigation and jurisdictional dismissals only
when society’s economic benefits from litigation and dismissal exceed
total social costs. 164
The efficiency costs of jurisdictional litigation and dismissals include,
most notably, the parties’ litigation costs and the court’s adjudication
costs. 165 They also include consequential expenses, such as the cost of
duplicative proceedings in state court following a federal court
dismissal, 166 or the cost of the entire federal court proceedings
(discovery, motions practice, trial, etc.) in cases where jurisdictional
dismissal occurs late in the trial court process or for the first time on
appeal. 167
Although the costs of jurisdictional litigation often overshadow its
benefits, benefits do exist. First, positive externalities can arise from
jurisdictional litigation.168 Published jurisdictional decisions have
precedential value for similarly situated litigants, 169 and deter other

162. See infra Part II.B.2.
163. See infra Part II.B.3.
164. For the sake of brevity and expositional clarity, I am glossing over more intricate
definitions and measures of social optimality. See, e.g., Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and
Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L. REV. 890, 913 n.116 (2010) (acknowledging “various
definitions of efficiency, including Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency,” but arguing that
“in the context of implementing a previously established goal, efficiency can be defined as
achieving [a] goal at the lowest cost, subject to all applicable constraints”).
165. Most commonly, such costs include the expenses associated with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
166. See Hoagland v. Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 385 F.3d 737, 739–40 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that, as a result of a federal court’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, “the parties
will often find themselves having to start their litigation over from the beginning [in state court],
perhaps after it has gone all the way through to judgment”).
167. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 2166, 2179 (1988) (“Parties
often spend years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court
that lacked jurisdiction.”).
168. A “harmful externality is defined as a cost or benefit that the voluntary actions of one or
more people imposes or confers on a third party or parties without their consent.” ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 45 (1988).
169. See Lederman, supra note 97, at 227.
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parties from transcending jurisdictional boundaries. Second,
jurisdictional litigation effectuates the structural values discussed above,
giving courts an opportunity to consider and assert interests relating to
separation of powers and federalism. 170
In terms of social benefits, social costs, and other efficiency subvalues, the timing of jurisdictional litigation is important. 171 Ideally,
jurisdictional rules should incentivize private-party actors and courts to
raise jurisdictional defects at a point that maximizes social welfare
(defined as social benefits minus social costs). 172
For most cases, the outset of litigation presumably would be the
socially optimal moment to raise jurisdictional defects.173 At that
moment, the parties and court have incurred minimal litigation and
adjudication costs, and a jurisdictional dismissal would be less wasteful
than it would be later on in the proceedings. 174 Moreover, the social
benefits of jurisdiction arguably are maximized at that point as well—
early action on jurisdiction serves as a clear affirmation of the structural
values underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability. 175
2.

The Problem: Perverse Private-Party Incentives

There appears to be a consensus among scholars, however, that
jurisdictional rules often are inefficient and create needless social
waste. 176 In part, I attribute this social cost to the perverse private-party
170. See supra Part II.A.
171. Cf. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1415 (2011) (noting
that “[a] delay in resolving civil litigation ordinarily causes the ultimate decision’s value to decline
more rapidly for plaintiffs than the delay produces value for defendants, making it socially
inefficient”).
172. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2–3 (2004)
(noting that an economic analysis of the law seeks to adopt legal rules that maximize social
welfare).
173. Although this statement is true for most cases, it is not true for all cases. If a case is fairly
straightforward on the merits but presents thorny or complex jurisdictional issues, then adjudication
of jurisdiction at the outset of the suit may be inefficient in that particular case.
174. See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 562, 615 (2009) (observing that “dismissal . . . at an early stage of the litigation may conserve
judicial resources, whereas dismissal at a later stage of an action, when significant judicial resources
have already been expended, may waste judicial resources”).
175. Stated another way, if a court proceeds with an adjudication of the merits without
adequately analyzing jurisdictional issues, there is a risk that the court is exercising power it does
not have.
176. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Imagining the Alternative Futures of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 28 GA. L. REV. 913, 947 (1994) (arguing that “jurisdictional rules need to be clear and
certain, so that the resources of the parties and the courts are not wasted in elaborate proceedings to
determine if there is subject matter jurisdiction”); Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient
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incentives of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules. First, existing rules
incentivize parties to file jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits in federal
court. 177 Second, the rules incentivize defendants to adopt a wait-and-see
approach—the defendant waits until the federal court renders a decision
on the merits, and uses a jurisdictional defect as a tool to vacate an
adverse judgment. 178 Third, because existing rules allow either party to
raise a jurisdictional defect at any time, plaintiffs have incentives to wait
as well. 179 Meanwhile, the parties and court continue to incur litigation
costs.
a.

Incentives to File Jurisdictionally Suspect Lawsuits

Many—perhaps most—plaintiffs file lawsuits in federal court only
after concluding federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists.180
Nevertheless, our current jurisdictional rules fail to adequately
disincentivize plaintiffs from filing jurisdictionally suspect actions in
federal court. Specifically, the absence of a particular moment early in
litigation when jurisdiction is conclusively resolved—and beyond
further challenge—makes the existence of jurisdiction (and the odds of
jurisdictional litigation) highly uncertain in many cases. As a result of
this uncertainty, some plaintiffs choose to roll the dice and file a lawsuit
in federal court, even though they have knowledge of a potentially fatal
jurisdictional defect.
At first blush, this seems counterintuitive—one would assume that
many plaintiffs would seek to avoid the uncertainty of federal court
jurisdiction by filing their lawsuits in state court. State court subjectmatter jurisdiction is broad, 181 and plaintiffs filing state court actions
usually do not incur the costs and risks associated with jurisdictional
litigation. 182 In contrast, federal jurisdiction is more uncertain because
Deployment of Rules and Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 531
(2012) (noting that “scarce judicial resources may appear to have been wasted upon a belated
decision that subject matter jurisdiction is absent”).
177. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
178. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
179. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (requiring that a plaintiff’s complaint include “a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction”).
181. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, § 3522 (noting that “[m]ost state courts are courts of
general jurisdiction”).
182. This assumes that a plaintiff files in the correct state court. See Edson R. Sunderland,
Problems Connected with the Operation of a State Court System, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 585, 585–86
(noting that state court systems often are divided into a variety of separate divisions handling
specialized matters).
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three alternative scenarios are possible: (1) jurisdictional litigation might
occur, and a federal court might conclude it has jurisdiction, proceeding
to the merits of the case; 183 (2) jurisdictional litigation might occur, and
a federal court might conclude it does not have jurisdiction, dismissing
the case so the plaintiff can re-file in state court; 184 or (3) jurisdictional
litigation might not occur at all, perhaps because neither the defendant
nor the court notices a jurisdictional defect.185 Due to this uncertainty, in
many cases a plaintiff’s expected cost of litigating in federal court may
be higher than litigating in state court. 186
There are circumstances, however, in which plaintiffs have an
incentive to incur these risks and costs associated with uncertain federal
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the social cost generated by jurisdictionally
suspect lawsuits. For example, a plaintiff might roll the dice on federal
court litigation—despite having knowledge of a jurisdictional defect—if
a large positive disparity exists between the plaintiff’s expected federal
court benefit and expected state court benefit.187 Similarly, a plaintiff

183. Plaintiff’s expected benefit if jurisdictional litigation occurs, and if the federal court
upholds its own jurisdiction and proceeds to the merits, would be pL [pJ (p1 (L1) – (c1 + cJ))], where
pL represents the odds that jurisdictional litigation will occur, pJ represents the odds that the federal
court will conclude that it has jurisdiction, p1 is the probability that the plaintiff wins on the merits
in federal court, L1 represents plaintiff’s expected judgment amount if plaintiff wins, c1 represents
plaintiff’s costs of litigating the merits in federal court, and cJ is the cost plaintiff incurs to litigate
jurisdiction.
184. Plaintiff’s expected benefit if jurisdictional litigation occurs, the federal court dismisses for
lack of jurisdiction, and the plaintiff then re-files the case in state court would be pL [(1 – pJ)(p2 (L2)
– (c2 + cJ))], where pL represents the odds that jurisdictional litigation will occur, (1 – pJ) represents
the odds that the federal court will conclude that it lacks jurisdiction, p2 is the probability that the
plaintiff wins on the merits in state court, L2 represents the expected judgment amount if the
plaintiff wins in state court, c2 represents plaintiff’s costs of litigating the merits in state court, and
cJ is the cost plaintiff incurs to litigate jurisdiction in federal court before the case is dismissed.
185. Plaintiff’s expected benefit if jurisdictional litigation does not occur and the federal court
proceeds to the merits would be (1 – pL)(p1 (L1) – c1), where (1 – pL) represents the odds that
jurisdictional litigation will not occur, p1 is the probability that the plaintiff wins on the merits in
federal court, L1 represents the expected judgment amount if the plaintiff wins, and c1 represents
plaintiff’s costs of litigating the merits in federal court.
186. The plaintiff’s total expected federal court benefit would be pL [pJ (p1 (L1) – c1) + (1 – pJ)(p2
(L2) – c2) – cJ ] + (1 – pL)(p1 (L1) – c1), which is the sum of the three alternative federal jurisdictional
scenarios described above. In contrast, a plaintiff’s expected benefit of litigating in a state court of
general jurisdiction is simpler (reflecting an absence of jurisdictional litigation): p2 (L2) – c2. If nonjurisdictional variables (i.e., probability that plaintiff wins, judgment amount, litigation costs) are
constant between federal and state courts, plaintiffs would always choose to litigate in state court, in
order to minimize litigation costs.
187. Most notably, this could occur if a plaintiff seeks to enforce a federal law claim. See
Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An
Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 213–14 (1983) (noting that
scholars have suggested that state courts can be “hostile to the vindication of [federal] rights”).
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may file a jurisdictionally suspect lawsuit if he or she thinks it is
unlikely that the defendant or the court will discover the jurisdictional
defect. 188 And even if a plaintiff’s intentions are entirely noble, the cost
of investigating jurisdiction before the commencement of suit may deter
the plaintiff from doing so. 189
The problem is that our current approach to jurisdictional rules further
incentivizes this type of inefficient behavior by plaintiffs. There is no
moment early in litigation when federal district courts conclusively
resolve jurisdictional issues; 190 instead, jurisdictional questions linger
like a cloud of doubt over many lawsuits. If the parties do not file a Rule
12(b)(1) motion, a jurisdictional defect can easily escape a court’s
attention at the moment when dismissal is least costly. 191 Even if the
parties litigate jurisdiction early on, an order that erroneously upholds
jurisdiction is not immediately appealable,192 and the parties might
litigate for years before an appellate court conclusively resolves whether
jurisdiction exists. Faced with this uncertainty, plaintiffs who are
otherwise inclined to file lawsuits in federal court know there is a good
chance they can get away with a jurisdictional defect—if not forever, at
least until they can obtain a more favorable settlement.
b.

Incentives for Defendants to Wait and See

Jurisdictional nonwaivability incentivizes inefficient behavior by
defendants as well. Sometimes the defendant has little incentive to
investigate and raise a jurisdictional defect early on, when the social
costs of a defect can be minimized. Instead, it may be in the defendant’s
interest to wait to fully investigate jurisdiction, or to withhold a
jurisdictional objection until after the court renders a judgment on the
merits. If there is an adverse result at that point, the defendant then has a
powerful incentive to fully investigate jurisdiction, using any defect as a
procedural trump card to vacate the judgment.
Once a plaintiff files a lawsuit in federal court, the defendant has two
188. Even worse, the plaintiff may take a chance on a jurisdictionally suspect lawsuit if he or
she thinks it is possible to hide the jurisdictional defect from the defendant and the court.
189. For example, in low-dollar disputes the plaintiff would probably want to avoid any
litigation costs that are not absolutely necessary. In many such cases, it would probably be cheapest
for the plaintiff to go ahead and file a lawsuit in federal court, and voluntarily dismiss the action
without prejudice if a thorny (and costly) jurisdictional issue arises. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. d (1982).
191. See, e.g., Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dragas Mgmt., 497 F. App’x 313, 314 (4th Cir. 2012);
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 479 F. App’x 657, 657 (5th Cir. 2012).
192. E.g., United States v. Atwell, 681 F.2d 593, 594 (9th Cir. 1982).
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basic options when considering whether to challenge federal court
jurisdiction and, if so, when to mount that challenge. First, the defendant
can choose to contest jurisdiction at the outset of litigation.193 The
expected costs from contesting federal jurisdiction at the outset equal the
sum of the defendant’s jurisdictional investigation and litigation costs, 194
expected state court costs (if the jurisdictional challenge is
successful), 195 and expected federal court costs (if the jurisdictional
challenge is unsuccessful). 196
Most commonly, the defendant will raise jurisdictional issues up front
when expected federal court costs significantly exceed expected state
court costs, at which point the defendant has a clear preference for
litigating in state court. This makes sense—the greater the defendant’s
expected federal court costs are relative to the expected state court costs,
the more likely the defendant will be willing to incur the expense of
investigating and litigating jurisdiction as a means to an end.197
Second, the defendant could adopt a wait-and-see approach, rather
than investigating and challenging federal jurisdiction at the
193. Most commonly, this is accomplished through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
194. These costs represent a certain loss for the defendant if he or she files a motion to dismiss.
They are limited to the defendant’s own costs, however—the defendant pays neither the plaintiff’s
costs nor the state’s costs.
195. I am assuming that a plaintiff will re-file the case in state court following a jurisdictional
dismissal. Thus, the defendant incurs expected state court costs when making a motion to dismiss:
those costs equal the probability that the defendant will win the motion to dismiss, multiplied by the
sum of defendant’s state court litigation costs and expected state court liability amount. Expressed
formally, these expected state court costs would be (1 – pJ)(c2 + p2 (L2)), where (1 – pJ) is the
probability that the federal court lacks jurisdiction, c2 is the defendant’s cost of litigating the merits
in state court, p2 is the probability that the state court will issue a judgment against the defendant on
the merits, and L2 is the state court judgment amount.
196. Similar to expected state court costs, the defendant’s expected federal court costs equal the
probability that the defendant will lose the motion to dismiss, multiplied by the sum of the
defendant’s federal court litigation costs and expected federal court liability amount. Thus, the
defendant’s expected federal court costs would be pJ (c1 + p1 (L1)), where pJ is the probability that
the federal court has jurisdiction, c1 is the defendant’s cost of litigating the merits in federal court, p1
is the probability that the federal court will issue a judgment against the defendant on the merits,
and L1 is the federal court judgment amount.
Combining these expected costs, the defendant’s total expected cost from challenging jurisdiction
at the outset of litigation would be cJ + pJ (c1 + p1 (L1)) + (1 – pJ)(c2 + p2 (L2)) (adding the notation cJ
to represent defendant’s cost of litigating jurisdiction).
197. Jurisdictional litigation also is more likely if the defendant’s cost of raising jurisdictional
issues is low, or if the odds of a dismissal are high. See Buehler, supra note 96, at 129 (noting that
“a jurisdictional dispute occurs when a defendant’s expected benefit (namely, the probability that
the court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, multiplied by the defendant’s net benefit from
litigating in an alternative forum) exceeds its own costs of filing and litigating a motion to
dismiss”).
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commencement of litigation. Under this approach, the defendant
investigates and raises the jurisdictional defect only upon suffering an
adverse decision on the merits in federal court.198 This strategy uses
jurisdiction as a procedural trump card to vacate an adverse judgment—
the federal court dismisses the case, forcing the plaintiff to re-file in state
court; the defendant then receives a second chance to prevail (often
called “two bites at the apple”). 199
Obviously, the defendant will adopt a wait-and-see approach if the
costs of doing so are less than the costs associated with investigating and
raising jurisdiction at the outset.200 The defendant incurs several costs
from a wait-and-see approach, including (1) the cost of litigating the
merits in federal court; 201 (2) the cost of investigating and litigating
jurisdiction if the defendant loses on the merits; 202 (3) expected federal
court judgment costs (in the event that the defendant loses on the merits,
and a subsequent jurisdictional challenge is unsuccessful); 203 and (4)
expected state court costs (in the event that the defendant loses on the
merits, and a subsequent jurisdictional challenge is successful). 204
198. Kades, supra note 16, at 1.
199. Id.; see also Wagman, supra note 16, at 1419.
200. It is not unrealistic for a defendant to suspect that jurisdiction is lacking but nonetheless
forgo jurisdictional investigation and/or litigation entirely. For example, it is not in the defendant’s
interest to hunt for a jurisdictional defect if the combined cost of investigating and litigating
jurisdiction exceeds the expected reduction in the defendant’s costs resulting from shifting the
lawsuit from federal court to state court.
201. In various formal expressions below, I use c1 to denote the defendant’s costs of litigating
the merits in federal court. This represents a certain cost if the defendant waits to raise jurisdictional
defects until after a decision on the merits.
202. The defendant’s expected jurisdictional litigation costs must be multiplied by the odds that
the plaintiff will prevail on the merits in federal court (if the defendant wins, he or she will not raise
the jurisdictional defect). As a result, the defendant’s expected cost of litigating jurisdiction would
be p1(cJ), where cJ represents the defendant’s costs of investigating and litigating jurisdiction in
federal court, and p1 represents the odds that plaintiff will prevail on the merits in federal court.
203. These costs would equal the federal court judgment amount, multiplied by both the odds
that the defendant will lose on the merits in federal court, and the odds that the federal court will
then conclude that it has jurisdiction over the case. In formal notation, the defendant’s expected
federal court judgment costs would be p1(pJ)(L1), where p1 is the probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits in federal court, pJ is the probability that the federal court will conclude that it
has jurisdiction, and L1 is the judgment that the defendant will be liable for if he or she loses on the
merits in federal court.
204. Modeling expected state court costs is somewhat complicated, because the defendant
incurs these costs only if several contingencies materialize. Stated as simply as possible, the
defendant potentially would be on the hook for (a) the defendant’s costs of litigating the merits in
state court; and (b) the expected state court judgment amount should the defendant lose a second
time. These costs would be multiplied by the probability that the defendant will lose on the merits in
federal court (which would trigger a jurisdictional challenge), and the probability that the federal
court will in turn decide that it lacks jurisdiction over the case (which would shift the lawsuit to

04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:48 PM

686

[Vol. 89:653

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

With these costs in mind, the defendant has an incentive to adopt a
wait-and-see approach when it is possible that federal jurisdiction does
not exist, and when the outcome of the merits in both federal and state
court is highly uncertain (i.e., the parties have roughly even odds of
prevailing). 205 If it is unclear whether the defendant has a better chance
of prevailing in state court than federal court, there is no incentive to
spend resources on a jurisdictional fight up front—doing so would trade
a certain loss for no apparent gain. 206 Instead, the defendant will litigate
the merits first in federal court, gambling on the chance of a favorable
outcome. 207 If the outcome is unfavorable, the defendant can use
jurisdiction to get a dismissal, allowing another try in state court.208
Nonwaivable jurisdictional rules—and defendants’ perceptions about
the relative advantages of state courts and federal courts—exacerbate
this tendency for defendants to wait-and-see. To the extent that litigants
view federal courts as “defendants’ courts,” 209 the defendant will be
naturally disinclined to investigate and contest jurisdiction at the start of
federal court litigation, because doing so would potentially move the
litigation away from a favorable forum. 210 And nonwaivable

state court). Expressed formally, the defendant’s expected state court costs would be p1 [(1 – pJ)(c2 +
(p2 (L2)))], where p1 is the probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits in federal court, (1
– pJ) is the probability that the federal court will dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, c2 is the
defendant’s costs of litigating the merits in state court, p2 represents the odds that the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits in state court, and L2 represents the judgment that the defendant will be liable
for if he or she loses on the merits in state court.
Combining all of the costs discussed above, the defendant’s total expected cost from taking a
wait-and-see approach to jurisdiction would be c1 + p1 [cJ + pJ (L1) + (1 – pJ)(c2 + (p2 (L2)))].
205. Kades, supra note 16, at 19.
206. The desirability of a wait-and-see approach also depends in large part on the relationship
between the cost of litigating the merits and the cost of litigating jurisdiction. An incentive to wait
and see exists when the costs of litigating jurisdiction are high in relation to the costs of litigating
the merits—by waiting to raise the jurisdictional issue, the defendant avoids spending money on a
jurisdictional fight unless the defendant first loses on the merits. See Kades, supra note 16, at 18–
19. Additionally, the defendant will be more likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach if the judgment
amount is large in relation to his or her total litigation costs. If that is the case, the defendant will
find it worthwhile to expend a relatively small amount of resources to challenge jurisdiction and
relitigate the merits in state court, to possibly wipe away a large unfavorable federal court judgment
on the merits.
207. Kades, supra note 16, at 1.
208. Id.
209. 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
FEDERAL PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 25, at 190 (2d ed. 2009).
210. Of course, the defendant may have inaccurate perceptions regarding some or all of the
variables discussed above—the cost of litigating jurisdiction, the odds that jurisdiction exists, or the
expected judgment amount (either in federal court or state court, or both). For example, the
defendant’s perceptions could be skewed as a result of lack of information, or optimism bias. See
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jurisdictional rules give defendants a procedural trump card they can
play if litigation goes sour at some point; they know courts have an
obligation to dismiss, 211 and that considerations relating to litigation
waste or the parties’ motives are largely irrelevant.212
c.

Incentives for Plaintiffs to Belatedly Challenge Jurisdiction

Even if the defendant wins on the merits in federal court, a
jurisdictional defect does not necessarily fall by the wayside. Under that
scenario, the plaintiff may have an incentive to make a belated challenge
to the very jurisdiction that he or she invoked when filing the lawsuit. As
a result, if a latent jurisdictional defect exists, it might not matter who
wins in federal court—social waste probably is inevitable, thanks in
large part to jurisdictional nonwaivability.
A belated jurisdictional challenge occurs when the plaintiff has lost
on the merits in federal court, and concludes that the expected benefit
from relitigating the merits in state court 213 outweighs the costs of doing
so. 214 Significantly, “sunk costs” bias—the tendency of litigants to
“throw good money after bad” in order to recoup previous litigation
expenditures—may make this effect even worse, causing plaintiffs to
scuttle the jurisdictional ship in order to have another shot at winning,
this time in state court. 215
ROBERT G. BONE, THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 85–91 (2003) (discussing optimism bias
and information problems in the context of settlement). This too could incentivize the defendant to
wait and see on jurisdictional issues—the sum of inaccurately inflated or deflated values could
convert a positive-expected-value motion to dismiss into a negative-expected-value motion to
dismiss.
211. See, e.g., Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Capron v. Van
Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804).
212. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 575–76 (2004).
213. Plaintiff’s expected benefit from a belated jurisdictional challenge would be the benefit
plaintiff accrues from obtaining dismissal of the adverse federal court judgment (and the
opportunity to relitigate the case in state court), multiplied by the odds that the plaintiff will prevail
on a jurisdictional challenge. Thus, plaintiff’s expected benefit would be (1 – pJ)(p2 (L2) – L1) + pJ
(L1), where pJ represents the odds that the federal court has jurisdiction, (1 – pJ) represents the odds
that the federal court lacks jurisdiction, L1 is the amount of plaintiff’s adverse judgment in federal
court, p2 is the probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits in state court, and L2 is the
amount that plaintiff will win if he or she prevails on the merits in state court.
214. Plaintiff’s expected costs from a belated jurisdictional challenge include the cost of
litigating jurisdiction and the cost of relitigating the merits in state court, multiplied by the odds that
plaintiff will prevail on the jurisdiction challenge. Expressed formally, plaintiff’s expected costs
would be cL + cJ + (1 – pJ)(c2), where cL is plaintiff’s sunk federal court litigation costs, cJ represents
the cost of litigating jurisdiction, (1 – pJ) represents the odds that the federal court lacks jurisdiction,
and c2 is plaintiff’s expected state court litigation costs.
215. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
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The circumstances in which plaintiffs are most likely to raise a
belated jurisdictional defect are fairly obvious. Several factors can
contribute to a belated jurisdictional challenge, including a high
probability that plaintiff will win on the jurisdictional issue, low
jurisdictional litigation costs, and low state court litigation costs (perhaps
because plaintiff could use much of the discovery already produced in
federal court). Moreover, the greater plaintiff’s sunk costs are in the
federal court lawsuit, the more likely he or she will seek dismissal of the
federal action after suffering an adverse judgment, taking a gamble by
relitigating in state court. The nonwaivability of jurisdictional rules
makes this inefficient behavior possible.216
3.

Inadequate Incentives for Early Adjudication of Jurisdictional
Issues by Federal Courts

In theory, this divergence between private-party incentives and social
optimality would be cured as long as federal courts actively police their
own jurisdiction and dismiss jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits early on.
Unfortunately, existing rules provide inadequate incentives for courts to
do so in many cases.
At first glance, it appears that federal court judges already have a
powerful incentive to police their own jurisdiction—every case
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds is one less case on the court’s
docket. 217 In other words, policing jurisdiction is a way for courts to
reduce their caseloads and keep dockets manageable. 218 There is some
evidence that this occurs, especially in the context of pro se filings,
where federal courts screen plaintiffs’ complaints and routinely dismiss
suits early on jurisdictional grounds. 219
In many cases, however, courts remain passive until one of the parties
raises a jurisdictional defect (or files some other motion, giving the court
an opportunity to examine its jurisdiction sua sponte). For example, if

Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 113–14 (1990) (discussing the consequences of sunk costs bias).
216. Capron, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 126–27 (plaintiff invoked federal jurisdiction but, after
losing on the merits, argued successfully for the first time that jurisdiction did not exist).
217. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1621, 1633 (2012) (noting that federal court docket pressure gives those courts a significant
incentive to dismiss lawsuits).
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., McKinney v. Lichenstein, No. CV 13–4403–GAF (DTB), 2013 WL 3337816, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2013); Arroyo v. Massachusetts, No. CA 12–753 S., 2013 WL 3288106, at
*3, *5 (D.R.I. June 28, 2013); Martin v. State Bar of Tex., No. 3:12–CV–5063–N–BK, 2013 WL
3283729, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013).
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the parties do not move for dismissal early on, the dispute will not
command the court’s attention in any meaningful sense, and the court
may not have a chance to think about its own jurisdiction until after the
parties have engaged in discovery or have filed summary judgment
motions. 220
Such is the nature of our adversarial system—until the parties present
a dispute requiring adjudication, a judge has little incentive to invest
time and resources on jurisdictional rulings (especially when there are
pending motions in other cases on the court’s docket). 221 The problem,
of course, is that by the time an actual dispute arises, the parties may
have already made a significant investment in an action that lacks
jurisdiction, elevating the risk of litigation waste. 222
In sum, social cost from jurisdictional rules exists in large part
because a fundamental misalignment exists between private-party
incentives and social optimality. Under the various circumstances
described above, jurisdictional nonwaivability incentivizes parties to file
jurisdictionally suspect lawsuits in federal court, and to time
jurisdictional litigation in ways that can generate significant social cost.
Moreover, in many cases judges do not have an incentive to hunt for
jurisdictional defects early on.
III. A NEW APPROACH FOR SOLVING JURISDICTION’S
SOCIAL COST
How then do we solve jurisdiction’s social cost? In this Part, I
propose a new way in which we can achieve equilibrium among the
various structural and efficiency values discussed above. First, I critique
existing proposals to curb the negative consequences of jurisdictional
nonwaivability. 223 Second, I offer a solution to jurisdiction’s social cost:
courts must affirmatively adjudicate and resolve all jurisdictional issues
at the outset of litigation. 224
220. See, e.g., Chambers v. Kan. City Kan. Cmty. Coll., No. 11–CV–2646–CM–DJW, 2013
WL 3322315, at *2–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (dismissing claims on jurisdictional grounds while
adjudicating a motion for summary judgment), vacated on other grounds, 2014 WL 326021 (D.
Kan. Jan. 29, 2014); In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 1840, 2013 WL
3283859, at *1–3 (D. Kan. June 28, 2013) (analyzing jurisdiction six years after the action was filed
while summary judgment motions were pending).
221. See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 649, 649 (2010)
(noting that “in an adversarial system such as ours, the court’s role is constrained” and that “the
decision of the court is based solely on the information that the litigants presented”).
222. See supra notes 193–216 and accompanying text.
223. See infra Part III.A.
224. See infra Part III.B.
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Critique of Existing Proposals

In the last half-century, commentators have advanced several
proposals for reducing the waste associated with jurisdictional
nonwaivability. 225 Many of these proposals involve a cut-off point for
jurisdictional challenges, with limited exceptions. 226 None of these
proposals achieve optimal equilibrium among jurisdictional values,
however.
The American Law Institute has advanced the most significant
proposal to date to limit the negative consequences of nonwaivable
jurisdictional rules.227 The proposal would require parties to raise
jurisdictional issues before the beginning of trial or, alternatively, before
a dispositive decision on the merits (such as dismissal for failure to state
a claim, or summary judgment). 228 After that time, federal courts are
barred from considering jurisdictional defects, unless exceptional
circumstances exist—for example, the defect is intertwined with the
merits; a reasonable party could not discover the defect in a timely
manner; or there is evidence that the parties colluded to fabricate
jurisdiction. 229 Courts also could consider a defect at any time if doing
so “is required by the Constitution.” 230 The plan sought to eliminate the
negative effects of jurisdictional nonwaivability, while preserving
flexibility. 231
225. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64–66, 370–74; Collins, supra note 51, at 1893–96;
Dobbs, supra note 15, at 508–10; Gao, supra note 15, at 2405.
226. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64–65, 371–72; Gao, supra note 15, at 2405.
227. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64–66, 366–74; Jessica J. Berch, Waving Goodbye to
Non-Waivability: The Case for Permitting Waiver of Statutory Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Defects,
MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314633 (advocating the
adoption of the ALI’s proposal).
228. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64.
229. Id. at 64–65, 371–72. The proposal also provided an exception to its cut-off rule for
appellate review of district court jurisdictional decisions. Id. at 65; see also id. at 372.
230. Id. at 65. Interestingly, the commentary accompanying the ALI proposal insists that a
mandatory cut-off point for jurisdictional defects—“even issues going to the court’s power under
Article III”—would be perfectly constitutional. Id. at 368–69; see also id. at 426–36 (providing a
memorandum in support of the constitutionality of the ALI’s approach). The proposal’s drafters
relied on preclusion law principles for this theory, citing cases that held res judicata precluded
collateral attack on a prior judgment rendered without jurisdiction. See id. at 386 (citing Chicot
Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165
(1938)).
231. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 367. The ALI’s stated goal was “to provide every
incentive to both sides to seek resolution of the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction prior to the
commencement of trial.” Id. That said, the proposal intentionally avoided a requirement that federal
courts make a “pretrial jurisdictional determination in every case” because the ALI drafters
reasoned that “the ordinary case does not involve any substantial question of subject-matter
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Recently, Qian Gao used the ALI’s study as a starting point, and
proposed linking the jurisdictional cut-off rule to the pleading stage,
rather than trial. 232 She argued the ALI’s recommendation did not
adequately curb social waste associated with jurisdictional rules, because
“a cutoff point at commencement of trial may give parties several years
to prepare such a jurisdictional challenge.” 233 Gao proposed an earlier
bar, cutting off jurisdictional challenges when “the initial pleadings,
answers, and motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 have
been made.” 234 After that point, a court can consider jurisdiction only if
there is evidence of “fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or misconduct”
by the parties. 235
In comparison, Dan Dobbs argues that much of the social waste
associated with jurisdictional nonwaivability can be eliminated by
reinterpreting jurisdictional rules. 236 Specifically, he contends that
notions of jurisdictional nonwaivability arise from an overly broad
interpretation of Supreme Court case law. 237 Professor Dobbs maintains
that these cases do not allow jurisdictional challenges at any time and for
any reason; instead, litigants have an absolute right to raise a
jurisdictional defect at any time only if it “appears affirmatively from the
record.” 238 Otherwise, district courts have discretion to permit tardy
challenges to jurisdiction, but are not required to do so. 239
Finally, some advocate for incremental changes. Michael Collins
jurisdiction and . . . such a case should not be bogged down by unnecessary procedural
requirements.” Id. at 367–68.
232. See Gao, supra note 15.
233. Id. at 2397.
234. Id. at 2405.
235. Id.
236. See Dobbs, supra note 15.
237. Id. at 508; see also id. at 507 (arguing that “judicial opinions grossly exaggerate existing
rules that permit tardy jurisdictional attacks”).
238. Id. (quoting Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 386 (1884)). For
example, Professor Dobbs interprets the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Mansfield narrowly,
arguing that it condones belated dismissals for lack of jurisdiction only when the jurisdictional
allegations in the pleadings are insufficient, or when the jurisdictional defect is obvious from the
record. See Dobbs, supra note 15, at 521. He also explains away portions of the Mansfield opinion
that state that the parties or court can raise any jurisdictional defect at any time by noting that,
“these passages are, on the facts, clearly dicta.” Id. at 508–09.
239. Dobbs, supra note 15, at 510. Professor Dobbs also argues that jurisdictional statutes
merely codified these narrow circumstances in which litigants have a right to mount a belated
jurisdictional attack. Id. at 512–13. For example, he contends that the 1875 Judicial Act “certainly
does not contain the remotest suggestion that the parties have standing to make a belated
jurisdictional attack,” and does not “impose upon the judge a duty to hear or initiate such an attack.”
Id. at 513.
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recently argued that the history of jurisdictional nonwaivability likely
supports a more limited approach to solving jurisdiction’s social cost. 240
He suggests that historical practices might lend support for a proposal to
“resurrect some aspects of the older prima facie jurisdiction regime”
used by courts in the nineteenth century. 241 For example, Congress may
be able to pass a statute giving evidentiary weight to allegations of
jurisdictional fact in the pleadings, allowing courts to rely on that
evidence to dismiss a belated jurisdictional attack. 242 Professor Collins is
skeptical of an across-the-board cut-off for jurisdictional objections,
however. 243
Although these proposals are commendable, none achieves an optimal
equilibrium of jurisdictional values. The cut-off point in the ALI
proposal is too late; cutting off jurisdictional objections at the
commencement of trial or a dispositive ruling on the merits allows too
much waste—namely, the increasingly exorbitant cost of discovery in
civil litigation. 244 Although Qian Gao’s proposal cuts off jurisdictional
objections earlier, it does not address another problem with the ALI
plan—the unpredictability of its exceptions to the cut-off rule, which
likely would create social cost instead of eliminating it. 245 Professor
240. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1893–96.
241. Id. at 1893.
242. Id. at 1893–94. In particular, Professor Collins suggests selective use of prima facie
jurisdiction in certain categories of cases. Id. at 1896. For instance, Congress could target
circumstances in which a party invokes jurisdiction and then attacks it after losing on the merits, or
the defendant has knowledge of a jurisdictional defect but adopts a wait-and-see approach. Id. He
also notes that it might make sense to soften the consequences for common jurisdictional
mistakes—i.e., jurisdictional rules governing the citizenship of unincorporated business
organizations in diversity cases. Id.
243. Id. at 1895. Professor Collins notes that a sweeping cut-off rule would be similar to the old
common-law jurisdictional pleading regime, which he argues is inferior to the modern approach
ushered in by the 1875 Judiciary Act. Id. Although he admits that the modern approach incurs social
waste at times, Professor Collins contends that “foreclosing objections too quickly is likely to result
in unnecessary expenditure of federal judicial resources overall.” Id. Additionally, he rightly points
out that ad hoc exceptions to a cut-off rule would present “usual problems of unpredictability and
unevenness of application associated with non rule-like solutions.” Id.
244. See, e.g., Emily C. Gainor, Note, Initial Disclosures and Discovery Reform in the Wake of
Plausible Pleading Standards, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1441, 1441–42 (2011) (citing a case in which a
district court ordered production of nearly 660,000 documents, constituting around eighty percent of
the responding party’s office emails).
245. For example, under the ALI plan, a party could make an end-run around the cut-off rule
and belatedly challenge federal court jurisdiction if the facts underlying the jurisdictional defect
would have eluded a party of “reasonable diligence.” ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64. Similarly, a
federal court could ignore the cut-off rule if it concludes there has been “collusion or connivance” to
hide a jurisdictional defect. Id. These terms are not always easy to define. Although Gao’s proposal
avoids some of this uncertainty, it still includes an exception for “fraud, misrepresentation,
collusion, or misconduct by any or all parties,” which may lead to uncertainty in practice. Gao,

04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST

10/9/2014 4:48 PM

693

Dobbs’s proposal also is problematic in this regard, as it would create
costly uncertainty for litigants by giving district courts the discretion to
permit belated jurisdictional challenges on an ad hoc basis. 246
Additionally, these proposals are not sensitive enough to the structural
values underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability. While the ALI plan
includes an exception to the cut-off rule that permits a belated
jurisdictional attack “required by the Constitution,” 247 it elsewhere
echoes Professor Dobbs’s suggestion that it would be constitutional for
Congress to foreclose jurisdictional objections that are rooted in Article
III. 248 This theory is dubious in light of Supreme Court precedent, 249 and
disregards judicial prerogatives underlying separation-of-powers values
(specifically, the ability of the federal courts to protect the essential role
of the judiciary). 250 Moreover, by tying the cut-off for jurisdictional
objections to the actions (or inaction) of private-party litigants, the ALI
and Gao proposals severely limit the ability of federal courts to
effectuate federalism and separation-of-powers values by policing their
own jurisdiction. 251
Professor Collins’s suggestion that a prima facie jurisdiction approach
could provide a limited, but nonetheless significant, path to curbing
some of the socially undesirable effects of jurisdictional nonwaivability
is intriguing, but not without its own drawbacks. 252 On one hand, giving
evidentiary significance to the jurisdictional allegations in the parties’
pleadings could streamline jurisdictional litigation, saving costs. On the
other hand, Professor Collins seems to significantly underestimate the
advantage of some kind of cut-off point to mitigate the social cost of
jurisdiction. 253 As the discussion above demonstrates, a mandatory cutsupra note 15, at 2405.
246. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1895 (“Discretion to allow tardy objections on an ad hoc
basis . . . carries with it the usual problems of unpredictability and unevenness of application
associated with non rule-like solutions.”).
247. ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 65.
248. See id. at 368–69, 426–36; Dobbs, supra note 15, at 520 (“[T]here is no real question of
constitutionality involved in foreclosing jurisdictional issues at an early stage of litigation.”).
249. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (holding that Congress
cannot expand federal court jurisdiction beyond the scope provided by Article III).
250. See supra notes 133–136 and accompanying text.
251. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64 (deeming jurisdictional issues barred if the parties do
not raise those issues before “the commencement of trial on the merits” or before a
“decision . . . that is dispositive of the merits”); Gao, supra note 15, at 2405 (tying a similar cut-off
rule to the pleading stage).
252. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1893–96.
253. At one point, Professor Collins even suggests that “assigning a cut-off date for objections
as early as the initial responsive pleading seems calculated more toward guaranteeing a lack of care
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off point could go a long way toward realigning private-party incentives
with the social good.
B.

A New Approach: Achieving Jurisdictional Equilibrium

Given the shortcomings of these existing proposals, how can we
achieve equilibrium among jurisdictional values while solving
jurisdiction’s social cost? I advance a simple yet bold approach: we
should frontload jurisdictional adjudication. The rules should require
federal district courts to affirmatively certify the existence of jurisdiction
in every case, shortly after the onset of litigation. 254 After that point,
objections to statutory federal jurisdiction will be waived. 255 To
accommodate both structural and efficiency values, appellate courts also
should have discretion to immediately review jurisdictional orders when
the benefits of doing so would outweigh the costs. 256 Finally, courts
should use the threat of sanctions to deter private-party abuse of
jurisdictional rules. 257
1.

Early Jurisdictional Rulings

The best way to effectuate both structural and efficiency values is to
ensure the early adjudication of jurisdictional issues. I argue federal
district courts should affirmatively certify the existence of subject-matter
jurisdiction early on in each case.258 To facilitate jurisdictional
certification, we also should consider shifting to a fact-based
jurisdictional pleading standard, with appropriate limitations on
jurisdictional discovery. 259
a.

Mandatory Jurisdictional Certification

The clarity and finality of jurisdictional decisions serve both
structural and efficiency interests. To that end, federal district courts
should be required to issue a “jurisdictional certification” order at the

in the invocation of jurisdiction and in the courts’ consideration of it than toward the conservation
of any significant resources.” Id. at 1895.
254. See infra Part III.B.1.
255. See infra Part III.B.2.
256. See infra Part III.B.3.
257. See infra Part III.B.4.
258. See infra Part III.B.1.a.
259. See infra Part III.B.1.b.
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close of the pleadings. 260 The order would certify (and conclusively
resolve) the existence of statutory federal subject-matter jurisdiction, and
would include all factual findings and legal conclusions necessary to the
jurisdictional ruling. Alternatively, the order would dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Conceivably, a court would satisfy this requirement in many cases
simply by ruling on the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. 261 I
argue for a more expansive notion of jurisdictional certification,
however: district courts should issue an explicit decision on the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at an early stage in every case, as
a matter of course. Functionally, this type of threshold determination
would be analogous to certification of class actions under Rule 23, 262 or
the initial screening of subject-matter jurisdiction for in forma pauperis
complaints. 263
Mandatory jurisdictional certification would further efficiency values
for several reasons. First, it would force parties to litigate jurisdiction at
the outset, before incurring other litigation costs. 264 Second, the court’s
affirmative obligation to rule on jurisdiction makes it less likely that
jurisdictional defects will linger unnoticed.265 Third, issuance of a
jurisdictional certification order serves as a “dispatch” moment for an
interlocutory appeal of the jurisdictional issue. 266 Fourth, an order that
260. This requirement would not be novel; the federal rules already require district courts to
issue various rulings and orders early on in civil cases, because such judicial action serves important
interests. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (requiring district courts to issue orders relating to case
scheduling).
261. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
262. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); Besinga v. United States, 923 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1991)
(using “a bright line rule requiring trial courts to certify a class in a written order which clearly sets
out the class’s compliance with Rule 23”). Of course, my proposal differs in a significant way from
rules governing class certification: unlike decertification of class actions under Rule 23, I would not
allow courts to decertify jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). An ability by courts to do so
would mitigate the efficiency gains from my proposal.
263. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2012); see, e.g., Martin v. State Bar of Tex., No. 3:12-CV-5063N-BK, 2013 WL 3283729, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) (“Before screening an in forma pauperis
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the Court should always examine, sua sponte, if necessary,
the threshold question of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.”).
264. As discussed below, the requirement of jurisdictional certification would be paired with a
cut-off rule. See infra notes 295–311 and accompanying text. As a result, parties would know that
they need to make jurisdictional arguments prior to certification, or lose the right to do so.
265. Cf. Kristen M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator “Sneeze”?—Do Federal Courts Have
Jurisdiction Over “Interlocutory” Awards in Class Action Arbitrations?, 34 VT. L. REV. 493, 518
(2010) (noting, in the context of federal court review of class action arbitration procedures, that “a
large number of cases say absolutely nothing about whether jurisdiction actually exists, but instead
simply assume jurisdiction exists in order to reach a decision on the merits”).
266. Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956) (noting the district court’s
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includes all factual findings and legal conclusions relevant to a court’s
jurisdictional determination provides a clear rationale, reviewable on
appeal. 267
Additionally, my proposal is sensitive to the structural values
underlying federal jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is an expression of a court’s
power to adjudicate, 268 and judicial determination of the existence of
jurisdiction presents an opportunity for federal courts to assert and assess
various state, federal, legislative, and judicial prerogatives. 269 Other
proposals fail to take this into account when they tie a cut-off rule for
jurisdictional objections to the actions of private-party litigants. 270 By
requiring the district court to issue an order on jurisdiction, a mandatory
certification approach respects the institutional role of the federal courts.
The parties’ desire to waive jurisdiction is not enough; the court must
also weigh in. 271
Of course, this approach is not without potential drawbacks. 272 Most
notably, the costs of mandatory jurisdictional certification in every case
could outweigh its benefits. 273 Forcing federal courts to issue orders
confirming jurisdiction in the vast majority of cases—when jurisdiction
obviously exists—might be unnecessarily costly. And when cases
present difficult jurisdictional issues, frontloading those issues will force
litigants and courts to allocate resources to jurisdictional litigation early
on, which could undesirably affect plaintiffs’ incentives to file suits 274
and the parties’ incentives to settle.275 Indeed, these costs would be even
“dispatcher” role in the context of Rule 54(b), which allows district courts to certify an immediate
appeal of a final decision on a particular claim, even though other claims in the lawsuit remain
pending).
267. See 1 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:5 (10th ed. 2013)
(observing that the issuance of written class certification orders under Rule 23 facilitates appellate
review).
268. E.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009).
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. See ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 64; Gao, supra note 15, at 2405.
271. In this sense, it would be inaccurate to view my position as an argument for “waivable
jurisdiction” (despite my description of the current jurisdictional rules as “nonwaivable”). The
mandatory jurisdictional certification component of my proposal ensures that jurisdiction is not
completely waivable by the parties.
272. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CORP. L. 513, 518 (2011) (noting that “new rules for old
problems may help bring on new problems”).
273. I thank Daniel Klerman for raising and offering thoughts on this issue.
274. See Buehler, supra note 96, at 132 (arguing that an increase in the cost and frequency of
procedural litigation can deter some plaintiffs from filing suit).
275. If we force plaintiffs with meritorious claims to bear the costs and risks that are associated
with an initial round of procedural litigation, some of those plaintiffs (particularly those who are

04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST

10/9/2014 4:48 PM

697

more problematic in cases where jurisdictional issues are intertwined
with the merits. 276
Such concerns are significant, but not insurmountable. In most cases,
jurisdiction will be apparent in the pleadings, and the cost of issuing a
terse order confirming its existence will be de minimis. 277 In more
difficult cases courts might be able to minimize costs by sequencing
other potentially dispositive procedural issues before subject-matter
jurisdiction. 278 And if determining jurisdiction at an early stage in the
remaining cases is still too costly, perhaps that suggests it is time for
Congress and the federal courts to simplify jurisdictional rules 279 or pare
back the scope of jurisdictionality. 280 Ultimately, even if mandatory
jurisdictional certification incurs a marginal net loss in efficiency values,
the corresponding gain in structural values (namely, the court’s
consideration of separation-of-powers and federalism values in every
case) arguably justifies that cost.
b.

Facilitating Certification: Jurisdictional Pleading and Discovery

To facilitate jurisdictional certification, we also should consider a
shift to fact-based jurisdictional pleading, and limits to the scope of
risk-averse) might accept a settlement that is significantly less than the net amount they could
receive through the litigation process. Conversely, if defendants in unmeritorious cases are forced to
bear those costs and risks, they might be inclined to settle even though they would otherwise prevail
on the merits.
276. The ALI’s proposal recognized as much, creating a specific exception to its cut-off rule for
jurisdictional issues that are “sufficiently related to the merits . . . to justify deferring the matter until
trial.” ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 371.
277. For example, in a straightforward diversity case, the following language would suffice:
“The court concludes it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Based on the facts alleged in the
pleadings, the court finds plaintiff is a citizen of Oregon, defendant is a citizen of California, and
plaintiff has made good faith allegations that this action has an amount in controversy of $200,000.”
278. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007)
(holding that district courts have discretion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds before
reaching subject-matter jurisdiction); Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999)
(holding that district courts have discretion to decide straightforward personal jurisdiction issues
before deciding difficult subject-matter jurisdiction issues). See generally Scott C. Idleman, The
Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2001).
279. See, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (“Uncertainty
regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the
point particularly wasteful.”).
280. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (suggesting courts should presume
that a statutory limitation is nonjurisdictional unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise); Howard
Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 215, 216 (2008)
(arguing that “courts should consider a provision of positive law as jurisdictional only when its plain
language is addressed to the court and speaks in terms of judicial power about the class of cases that
courts can hear and resolve”).
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jurisdictional discovery.
First, early jurisdictional adjudication gives the contents of the
pleadings added importance. 281 To ensure the parties’ pleadings contain
adequate information to form the basis of a jurisdictional certification
order, we may need to amend or reinterpret rules to require heightened
pleading of jurisdictional facts. 282 Existing rules require minimal factual
detail for jurisdictional allegations, 283 and it is customary for complaints
to offer no more than a cursory sentence or two on jurisdiction. 284
A fact-based jurisdictional pleading standard—which would require
plaintiffs to allege both the basis for jurisdiction and the facts supporting
that basis—would root out vague and unhelpful averments. 285 It would
force parties to think through and support jurisdictional allegations
before filing suit and, more importantly, before incurring litigation
costs. 286 And a fact-based jurisdictional pleading approach would give
both the defendant and the court a more complete and adequate
understanding of the jurisdictional basis of the lawsuit, allowing early
adjudication. 287
281. See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794,
1812–13 (2002) (“It is important to establish the basic framework of the pleadings as early as
possible so that other pretrial activities can proceed.”).
282. After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), reinterpreted the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards for
stating a claim for relief, it is somewhat unclear whether the federal rules require factual plausibility
for jurisdictional allegations under Rule 8(a)(1). Compare Heirs of Deskins v. Consol. Energy, Inc.,
No. 1:11CV00069, 2012 WL 503636, at *2 (W.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2012) (suggesting that Twombly
does not apply to jurisdictional averments), with Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158–59 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Twombly applies to
jurisdictional facts). My argument for a fact-based approach to jurisdictional pleading assumes that
Twombly and Iqbal do not already require something akin to fact-based pleading for jurisdictional
allegations, which is a question for another day.
283. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1) (merely requiring “a short and plain statement of the grounds
for the court’s jurisdiction”).
284. This is not surprising, considering the paucity of factual detail included in Form 7 of the
federal rules, which gives examples of jurisdictional allegations that would be sufficient at the
pleading stage. See FED. R. CIV. P. Form 7.
285. This heightened standard would be similar to the fact-pleading approach that some state
courts use to assess whether plaintiff has stated a claim for relief. See, e.g., Harvey v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 610 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ark. 1981) (adhering to a fact-pleading approach, rather than a
notice-pleading approach); Teter v. Clemens, 492 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ill. 1986) (same).
286. As a result, mistaken invocation of federal court jurisdiction would be less likely. It also
would be difficult for parties to use conclusory allegations to intentionally hide potential
jurisdictional defects. Equally important, the defendant would be in a better position to make an
accurate assessment of the costs and benefits of making a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds.
287. I am not arguing that we turn back the clock to the days of common law pleading, when
courts dismissed claims with prejudice if litigants did not adhere to hyper-technical procedural
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Admittedly, fact-based pleading has potential disadvantages.
Ferretting out jurisdictional facts in the early stages of litigation is not
costless, and it is possible that defendants may use heightened pleading
rules in strategic ways that incur social costs. 288 In the vast majority of
cases, however, the jurisdictional facts will consist of fairly
straightforward information that is not costly to gather.289 And in cases
that present more jurisdictional complexity, the costs imposed by a factbased pleading standard will appropriately cause the plaintiff to think
through these issues before filing suit.
Second, efficiencies gained through early jurisdictional rulings will
mean little unless we also address the social cost arising from
jurisdictional discovery. 290 It is increasingly common for parties to
engage in a labor-intensive, costly round of discovery early in the
litigation process, prior to the court’s decision on a motion to dismiss. 291
To make matters worse, there is a dearth of case law in this area, and the
standards governing the scope of jurisdictional discovery are vague and
uncertain. 292
Rule makers and courts should consider revising the standards for
jurisdictional proof to streamline the process and minimize the need for
discovery prior to adjudication of jurisdictional issues. Perhaps courts
could operate on the assumption that facts alleged in the pleadings are
sufficient for jurisdictional adjudication. 293 In the event that more detail

formalities. See FREER, supra note 157, at 290. Instead, the jurisdictional fact-pleading standard I
envision would require a minimal level of factual heft, so parties and courts can accurately assess
subject-matter jurisdiction at an early stage.
288. For example, the defendant might strategically seek dismissal based on sparse
jurisdictional allegations in the complaint, even when jurisdiction likely exists. See Emil Petrossian,
In Pursuit of the Perfect Forum: Transnational Forum Shopping in the United States and England,
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1257, 1309 (2007) (noting that well-financed defendants frequently initiate
costly procedural litigation “to dry out the plaintiff’s resources”).
289. See, e.g., United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 957 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Wood, J., dissenting) (“Inquiries into diversity jurisdiction are often . . . straight forward, even
though fact-finding might be necessary in the occasional case . . . .”).
290. The federal rules do not explicitly authorize discovery of jurisdictional facts. That has not
stopped courts from authorizing jurisdictional discovery, however. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional
Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489, 497–501 (2010).
291. Id. at 536.
292. Id. at 492–93.
293. This is not unheard of. During much of the nineteenth century, federal courts heavily relied
on the pleadings to determine the existence of jurisdiction. Collins, supra note 51, at 1838–40.
“Prima facie” diversity jurisdiction existed if the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the parties were
citizens of different states, and such allegations were sufficient for federal courts to adjudicate the
merits, even when there was no jurisdiction in fact. Id. at 1837–39.
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is necessary, parties could use affidavits to present additional facts. 294
But courts should refuse to allow jurisdictional discovery unless the need
for that discovery clearly outweighs its costs.
In other words, I argue that courts should reverse the existing
presumption behind jurisdictional discovery: instead of starting from the
assumption that discovery is appropriate, courts should assume that the
pleadings and affidavits are sufficient to adjudicate the jurisdictional
issue, and should order discovery only when it is absolutely necessary.
Jurisdictional discovery likely would be rare under this approach, further
reducing litigation costs.
2.

Foreclosing Jurisdictional Challenges

Mandatory foreclosure of jurisdictional challenges after a specified
cut-off point should be a cornerstone of any proposal to solve
jurisdiction’s social cost. I argue that challenges to statutory jurisdiction
should be cut off at the close of the pleadings. 295 After that point, courts
could consider belatedly raised jurisdictional defects only if they
implicate constitutional concerns. 296
a.

Cutting off Objections to Statutory Jurisdiction

Much of the social cost of jurisdictional nonwaivability would be
mitigated if objections to statutory federal court jurisdiction were cut off
early on—ideally, at the close of the pleadings, when the district court
issues its jurisdictional certification order. 297 This approach would
provide incentives for the defendant to either make a motion to dismiss,
or identify jurisdictional defects in her answer to the complaint. 298
The main advantage to implementing this mandatory cut-off is that it
provides incentives for parties to investigate jurisdiction and litigate
jurisdictional defects early, before incurring other litigation costs.
Notably, it would eliminate incentives for the defendant to adopt a waitand-see approach, raising jurisdictional defects only after suffering an

294. Most relevant jurisdictional facts—such as the citizenship of the parties, the amount in
controversy, and federal law issues arising from the plaintiff’s claims—can be adduced from
pleadings with sufficient factual detail. In the unlikely event that more detail is needed, it would be
easy in most cases for the parties to attach affidavits or statements of jurisdictional fact to their
pleadings or to briefing submitted in advance of jurisdictional certification.
295. See infra Part III.2.a.
296. See infra Part III.2.b.
297. See Gao, supra note 15, at 2404–07.
298. See id. at 2405–06.
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adverse judgment on the merits. 299 It also would prevent the plaintiff
from mounting a belated challenge to the very jurisdiction that he or she
invoked when initially filing the lawsuit in federal court.300
The primary criticism against this type of mandatory cut-off—
particularly one that applies early in litigation—stems once again from
concerns relating to litigation costs. 301 The argument goes like this: cases
with latent jurisdictional defects are fairly rare, and the cost savings from
an early cut-off of jurisdictional objections in those few cases would be
greatly outweighed by the expense of parties investigating jurisdiction in
all cases—especially cases in which jurisdictional litigation would not
otherwise occur.
And yet, the federal court system already imposes other similar
threshold procedural requirements as a matter of course. For example,
Rule 26(a)(1) requires litigants in most civil actions to make initial
disclosures of essential factual information to the other side shortly after
the onset of litigation. 302 Similarly, Rule 11 requires the parties and their
counsel to perform a reasonable inquiry into the factual allegations in the
pleadings. 303 Even in the jurisdictional context, existing doctrine
prohibits litigants from collaterally attacking jurisdiction after a final
judgment. 304 We adhere to these rules—despite their short-term cost—
because they promote efficiency and just outcomes over the long-term. I
submit that an initial investment in jurisdictional matters by civil
litigants is no different.
Indeed, I am not entirely sure what types of complexity and costs the
doubters of a cut-off rule fear. Jurisdiction will almost certainly be easily
investigated and easily alleged in the vast majority of federal court cases,
at minimal cost to the parties. Most federal question complaints will
simply list an applicable federal law cause of action.305 Likewise, most
diversity pleadings will simply list the citizenship of parties who are
299. See supra notes 193–212 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text.
301. Collins, supra note 51, at 1895 (arguing that a jurisdictional cut-off rule would “result in
unnecessary expenditure of federal judicial resources overall”).
302. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1). See generally Gainor, supra note 244, at 1452–58.
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). See generally Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11: A
Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 727, 727–45 (2004) (analyzing the circumstances
in which Rule 11 is used by courts to sanction improper pleading practices).
304. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111–14 (1963); Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 375–76 (1940).
305. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005) (noting that “federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by
plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law”).
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without a doubt completely diverse, along with an amount in
controversy that is sufficient under plaintiff-friendly rules. 306 If
statements alleging subject-matter jurisdiction are more complex than
that, the parties and court probably ought to be thinking about
jurisdiction up front anyway.
b.

Using Article III as a Jurisdictional Backstop

Note that I am advocating an early cut-off point for challenges to
statutory jurisdiction only. Because federal courts probably have an
obligation to assess the constitutional basis for subject-matter
jurisdiction at any point, 307 they should be able to consider belated
arguments about Article III jurisdiction. Thus, even after litigation on
statutory jurisdiction is cut off, Article III provides a “jurisdictional
backstop,” ensuring that federal courts can assert and assess essential
structural values if need be.
Under my proposal, jurisdictional litigation after the cut-off point
presumably would be greatly reduced from status quo levels. At the
close of the pleadings, the parties will have raised or waived arguments
that would be based on the often confusing intricacies of statutory
subject-matter jurisdiction. 308 Many latent issues as to the court’s
constitutional jurisdiction will be relatively tame by comparison—i.e.,
whether there is a “federal ingredient” in federal question cases, 309 or
whether the parties are minimally diverse in diversity cases. 310 The outer
boundaries of Article III jurisdiction likely will be litigated less
frequently—and more predictably—than the contours of statutory
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir. 1974) (“It must
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify
dismissal.”).
307. See supra note 158.
308. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89 (2010) (noting that the legal test for a
corporation’s “principal place of business” for statutory diversity jurisdiction has been “difficult to
apply”); Grable, 545 U.S. at 314–16 (stating and applying the multiple-factor test for statutory
federal question jurisdiction).
309. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Congress can grant jurisdiction “whenever there exists in the background
some federal proposition that might be challenged, despite the remoteness of the likelihood of actual
presentation of such a federal question”); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 824–25 (1824) (upholding the constitutionality of a court’s exercise of federal question
jurisdiction under Article III because the federal question “forms an original ingredient” of the
lawsuit).
310. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (noting that
Article III merely requires “minimal diversity,” which exists “so long as any two adverse parties are
not co-citizens”).
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jurisdiction, 311 reducing social costs associated with the jurisdictional
inquiry.
Undoubtedly, some thorny Article III jurisdictional issues will
persist. 312 For example, a cut-off point for statutory jurisdictional
requirements does little to curb the costs of belated litigation on
standing, ripeness, or mootness, which are rooted in constitutional
limitations on federal jurisdiction,313 and can involve elaborate and
complex jurisdictional determinations. 314
But we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. 315
Mandatory jurisdictional certification, paired with an early cut-off rule
for statutory jurisdictional challenges, likely will address most of the
social waste at play. 316 Additionally, constitutional limits on jurisdiction
arguably protect vital structural interests,317 making it somewhat easier
to justify the social cost of dismissals based on latent jurisdictional
defects. Thus, even if a cut-off for challenges to statutory jurisdiction
will not solve all problems associated with jurisdictional nonwaivability,
it is a step in the right direction.
3.

Interlocutory Appeal of Jurisdictional Rulings

In addition to jurisdictional certification and a cut-off point, one of the
most significant ways to reduce jurisdiction’s social cost would be to
311. Granted, the boundaries of Article III jurisdiction are not always clear, and are sometimes
quite murky, due in no small part to the Supreme Court’s efforts to sidestep questions of
constitutional jurisdiction in the past. FALLON ET AL., supra note 147, at 763–73 (analyzing nuances
in constitutional federal question jurisdiction). Even so, my proposal would at least give federal
courts greater opportunity to clarify these boundaries.
312. I thank Kathryn Watts for raising and offering thoughts on this issue.
313. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
314. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Marbury v. Madison as the First Great Administrative Law
Decision, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 481, 484 (2004) (describing standing, ripeness, and mootness as
“a maze of complicated and partially overlapping doctrines”).
315. M. de Voltaire, La Begueule, Conte Moral, in CONTES ET POÉSIES DIVERSES A3 (1772)
(stating “le mieux est l’ennemi du bien”; translated, “the best is the enemy of the good”).
316. It appears that statutory federal question and diversity jurisdiction issues come up much
more often than constitutional standing, mootness, and ripeness questions. A Westlaw search for all
federal cases decided during June 2013 in which the word “jurisdiction” appears within 200 words
of “federal question” or “diversity” yielded 800 results. In comparison, a similar search for June
2013 cases in which the word “jurisdiction” appears within 200 words of “standing,” “mootness,” or
“ripeness” produced 350 results.
317. See, e.g., A. Christopher Bryant, Presidential Signing Statements and Congressional
Oversight, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 169, 180 (2007) (suggesting, in the context of presidential
signing statements, that Article III justiciability doctrines “protect core structural values by
circumscribing the role of the judiciary in . . . highly politicized and policy-sensitive
disagreements”).

04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/9/2014 4:48 PM

704

[Vol. 89:653

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

allow interlocutory appeals of jurisdictional decisions at the discretion of
the federal appellate courts. 318 This flies in the face of current practice—
currently, rulings on jurisdictional issues are not immediately
appealable, and normally are appealed only after the trial court issues a
final judgment. 319 The final judgment rule arises from a desire to prevent
wasteful piecemeal appeals. 320
A limited ability by appellate courts to grant discretionary review of
interlocutory jurisdictional rulings at an early stage of litigation could
obviate significant waste in many cases. 321 This would be especially true
when the jurisdictional issue is novel or uncertain, or when it is probable
that the trial court’s jurisdictional ruling is erroneous.322 These
circumstances make it more likely that the jurisdictional ruling
eventually would be reversed on appeal, after the parties spend
significant resources litigating the merits.323 Interlocutory review of
jurisdictional rulings would be appropriate at that point, and would
likely decrease overall social costs—in particular, wasted litigation
resources—while respecting structural values. 324
Fortunately, an analogous model for this type of discretionary
appellate review already exists: under Rule 23(f), federal appellate
318. See Collins, supra note 51, at 1895 n.274 (noting that existing proposals for jurisdictional
cut-off rules fail to address the significant costs of “eleventh-hour jurisdictional reversals” on
appeal).
319. See, e.g., Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1117–18 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Eastman v.
Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2006).
320. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009).
321. Congress has recognized the efficiency benefit of interlocutory review in similar contexts.
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) (allowing appellate courts to hear discretionary appeals of
“order[s] involv[ing] a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation”); see also S. REP. NO. 85-2434, at 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255, 5256 (citing “the need for expedition of cases pending before the district
courts” as the reason for § 1292(b)).
322. Indeed, if the jurisdictional issue is novel or uncertain, the district court and court of
appeals likely could exercise their discretion and allow immediate appeal of the jurisdictional order
under § 1292(b), meaning my proposal could be partially accomplished using existing jurisdictional
statutes.
323. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1177–78 (1990) (noting that decisions on uncertain law are more
likely to be reversed by appellate courts).
324. Specifically, discretionary interlocutory review would serve as something akin to a
litigation pressure-release valve—if the appellate courts notice a novel or uncertain jurisdictional
issue, they could resolve that issue early on, allowing the parties to proceed with litigation with the
certainty that jurisdiction exists (or re-file in state court if it does not). And there would be no
structural concerns if the interlocutory review mechanism is statutory, because Congress will have
given its consent.
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courts have discretion to permit an immediate interlocutory appeal of
“an order granting or denying class-action certification.” 325 The rule
does not facilitate undue delay, 326 and interlocutory appeals on class
action certification rulings are far from common. 327
Similarly, Congress or rule makers could give federal courts
discretionary authority to exercise immediate appellate review of
jurisdictional rulings when the benefits of interlocutory review outweigh
the costs of further jurisdictional litigation. The relevant statutes and
rules could codify factors that appellate courts must consider when
deciding whether to grant immediate review—i.e., the jurisdictional
issue is novel, and delaying appellate review would cause the parties and
courts to incur unnecessary costs.
Let me be clear: I do not advocate mandatory appellate review of
interlocutory jurisdictional rulings, nor do I think it would be wise to
have widespread use of a discretionary appellate review mechanism.
Interlocutory appeal of jurisdictional rulings should be fairly rare, and
strictly limited to cases in which there is good reason to think that
immediate intervention by appellate courts would prevent social waste.
4.

Using Sanctions to Deter Abuse by Litigants

Finally, some might argue that the proposed approach I outline here
would strip a federal court of its discretionary ability to dismiss a case
when it belatedly discovers that jurisdiction was fabricated or
manufactured through “fraud, misrepresentation, collusion, or
misconduct by any or all parties.” 328 The thrust of this critique is that
clear jurisdictional rules lack nuance that would allow courts to check
against abuse by litigants. 329
I do not dispute the importance of this point. Instead, I argue that
325. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Some Joy in Whoville: Rule 23(f),
A Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97 (2001); Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines,
Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States
Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531 (2000). Other similar analogs
also exist in limited niches of federal jurisdictional law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2012)
(giving appellate courts discretion to hear an appeal from a remand order).
326. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless
the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.”).
327. See 2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 282, § 7:2 (noting that federal courts have emphasized
that “appellate review of class certification decisions should not be routine”).
328. Gao, supra note 15, at 2405.
329. See, e.g., ALI STUDY, supra note 18, at 372 (justifying the nuance of the exceptions to its
jurisdictional cut-off approach in part because “federal courts should remain free at all times to
reject improper efforts to impose jurisdiction by consent”).
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abuse can be discouraged through other means. Most notably, courts
could use the threat of ex post sanctions for collusion and connivance to
incentivize proper litigant behavior ex ante. 330 As long as sanctions are
severe enough to deter wrongful conduct, litigants presumably will
behave. 331
The key point is that courts must set the expected sanction amount so
that it exceeds the litigants’ expected benefit from manufacturing
jurisdiction or colluding to hide a jurisdictional defect. 332 Suppose, for
example, that plaintiff and defendant’s collective net benefit from hiding
a jurisdictional defect (and litigating in federal court instead of state
court) is $50,000. 333 Suppose also that there is only a ten percent chance
that the federal court will discover the defect and the parties’ collusion.
If that is the case, the magnitude of the sanction must be set in excess of
$500,000, so that the parties will be properly deterred. For example, if
the court sets the magnitude of the sanction at $500,001, then the
expected sanction (after multiplying the sanction magnitude by a ten
percent probability of enforcement) will be $50,000.10. Theoretically,
that amount will be enough to deter parties who would otherwise receive
$50,000 collectively if they colluded to manufacture jurisdiction.
Proper use of sanctions would render discretionary exceptions for
collusion or other litigant misbehavior unnecessary. This in turn would
enhance the clarity and predictability of jurisdictional rules—Congress
or rule makers could adopt a strict, mandatory jurisdictional cut-off rule,
while using sanctions to guard against litigant misbehavior.

330. E.g., Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 531, 619 (1994) (“The development of judicially-imposed sanctions in litigated
proceedings . . . has had beneficial effects on litigative behavior: discouragement of frivolous
assertions and deterrence of tactical litigation abuses.”).
331. A complete analysis of the desirability and workability of sanctions in the context of
jurisdictional allegations is beyond the scope of this Article. My point here is more general: there
are other methods—including sanctions—that Congress, rule makers, and courts can use to deter
litigant abuse.
332. Additionally, a court may need to use nonmonetary sanctions—such as its power to hold
litigants in contempt—when a litigant’s expected benefit from manufacturing jurisdiction exceeds
its assets. See SHAVELL, supra note 172, at 230–31 (noting that judgment-proof individuals view
losses exceeding their assets as merely equaling their assets, and are inadequately deterred).
333. There are several scenarios in which a federal forum would be mutually preferable to both
plaintiff and defendant. Perhaps the plaintiff has greater faith that federal courts will enforce federal
law claims. Perhaps the defendant simultaneously believes that a federal court jury will be more
defendant-friendly than a state court jury.

04 - Buehler_final author review.docx (Do Not Delete)

2014]

SOLVING JURISDICTION’S SOCIAL COST

10/9/2014 4:48 PM

707

CONCLUSION
Federal court subject-matter jurisdiction rules create significant social
cost. They inflate litigation expenses, increase jurisdictional litigation,
and make it more likely that litigants will play games with the rules for
their own advantage. In light of this social cost, it is quite remarkable
that litigants, scholars, and judges are so willing to accept the
disadvantages of nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, without arguing more
forcefully for change.
Change starts with a new mindset, and a new approach to our
jurisdictional rules. We must view the structural and efficiency values
underlying jurisdictional nonwaivability for what they are: multipolar,
pluralistic, incommensurable, and at times conflicting. Rather than
framing these values in a traditional, monistic way, we should seek
solutions that identify and accommodate all relevant value sets, and
achieve equilibrium among the various interests at play. Of course, those
interests are, as always, more complicated than they first appear.
Solving the social cost of jurisdiction will not be easy. And yet, it
remains a noble goal. Adoption of the proposals outlined in this
Article—mandatory jurisdictional certification, a cut-off point for
jurisdictional objections, an opportunity for interlocutory appeal of
jurisdictional rulings, and sanctions to deter litigant abuse—would go a
long way toward achieving equilibrium among structural and efficiency
values. And even if some or all of these ideas do not come to fruition,
perhaps they will at least provoke a meaningful debate on jurisdictional
values, and our nonwaivable jurisdictional rules.

